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ACCOUNTING FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
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Abstract
We investigate what accounts for the observed international di¤erences in schooling and fertil-
ity, and draw lessons for the underlying sources of cross-country income di¤erences. For this
purpose, we extend a life-cycle dynastic model to include features relevant for schooling and
fertility choices. Our approach allows for country-specic human capital technologies in addi-
tion to di¤erences in TFP, public education policies, and demographic factors. We nd that
di¤erences in human capital production functions, specically in the degree of complementarity
of educational investments, are key to match schooling data, and result in novel estimates of
human capital stocks and TFP levels. According to the model, di¤erences in TFP, public edu-
cation spending per pupil and retiree survival rates are the most important factors explaining
the international dispersion of fertility. Di¤erences in the number of years of public education
provision and working-age survival rates are key determinants of the schooling dispersion. Our
model suggests that human capital policies are key for development.
Key words: public education, fertility, mortality, schooling, parental altruism, TFP
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1 INTRODUCTION
Fertility data from the World Bank and school enrollment data from UNESCO indicate that a
woman in Niger is expected to have 7.62 children, and each child is expected to attend school for
5.3 years. In contrast, a woman in Finland is expected to have 1.75 children, and her children
are expected to attend school for 19.6 years. Figure 1 illustrates this well-known international
quantity-quality trade-o¤ for a cross-section of 92 countries in 2013.1 Around the world, one more
child per women is associated with an average of three fewer years of schooling.
Many explanations for the high-fertility low-schooling trade-o¤ have been identied in the lit-
erature: high child mortality risk; low wages and the associated low opportunity costs of allocating
Department of Economics, Iowa State University, 279 Heady Hall, Ames IA 50010, e-mail: cordoba@iastate.edu.
yEconomics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan, Hubei, 430072, China, e-mail:
xiyingliu@whu.edu.cn.
zDepartment of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, 4532 W.W. Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh PA 15260, e-mail:
ripoll@pitt.edu.
1The measure of schooling in Figure 1 corresponds to school life expectancy from UNESCO, which is the years of
schooling a child is expected to attend given the current enrollment rates at all ages. More details on the data used
in Figure 1 are explained in Section 3.
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time to raise children; low returns to schooling; limited access to high-quality publicly provided
education; and other social norms and cultural factors. While not an exhaustive list, examples of
some of the empirical and theoretical papers exploring these explanations include: child mortality
risk (Angeles, 2010; Canning et al. 2013; Wilson, 2015); wages and time cost of raising children
(Barro and Becker, 1989; Becker and Barro, 1988; Becker and Lewis, 1973; Galor and Weil, 1996;
Manuelli and Seshadri, 2009); returns to schooling (Becker et al., 1990; Galor and Weil, 2000); and
provision of public education (Breierova and Du­ o, 2004; Castro-Martin and Juarez, 1995; de la
Croix and Doepke, 2004; Doepke, 2004; Kirk and Pillet, 1998; Pradhan and Canning, 2015).
This paper proposes a unied microfounded framework to quantitatively assess the contribution
of multiple factors in explaining the international evidence on schooling and fertility. We focus on
the role of di¤erences across countries in three types of variables: total factor productivity (TFP);
age-dependent mortality rates; and the provision of public education in terms of the number of
years provided and spending per pupil. While these factors have been analyzed separately in the
literature, we study them within the same unied framework. This unied framework uncovers
novel interactions and amplication e¤ects among di¤erent determinants of schooling and fertility
choices.
Our model features altruistic parents who make fertility choices in a version of the Barro and
Becker (1989) model, and who nance the consumption and private educational expenditures of
their children during schooling years. Human capital technologies are of the Ben-Porath type.
A publicly provided education subsidy is available for a number of years and nanced through
lump-sum taxes. Parents face both time and goods costs of raising children. Financial frictions
play a role in our theory, since parents have access to credit, but children fully depend on their
parentsresources during schooling years. Parents have no control over their adult childrens income,
cannot borrow against their childrens future income, and cannot enforce nancial obligations on
their children to compensate for the cost of raising them.2 These nancial frictions are at the core
of the model generated quantity-quality trade-o¤ because parental income becomes a determinant
of the number of children as well as the educational resources that can be invested on each of
them. In large families income is diluted among the many children, each of whom will have access
to less resources during childhood. To the extent that parental income plays a role in fertility
and educational choices, the provision of public education becomes a rst-order determinant of
educational and fertility outcomes.
The calibration of our model is to a large extent standard, but it features cross-country di¤er-
ences in key dimensions that turn out to be quantitatively relevant. Age-dependent mortality rates
are calibrated to t country-specic life tables. The provision of public education in each country
reects realistic heterogeneity in both the number of years of provision (extensive margin), as well
as spending per pupil (intensive margin) as documented by UNESCO. TFP levels are computed as
residuals to match per capita GDP in each country in 2013. Parameters common to all countries
are calibrated to match features of the international evidence. As we show, these basic forces go a
2See Schoondbroot and Tertilt (2014) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2016) for a more detailed discussion on the
relevance of these intergenerational credit constraints.
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long way in explaining the international schooling and fertility data.
In order to perform precise accounting and counterfactual exercises, we enrich the benchmark
model so that it exactly matches the schooling and fertility data. For this purpose, we allow for
country-specic human capital technologies and altruism. We nd that in countries such as Niger
and Mali, low child discounting helps explain their particularly high fertility levels, beyond what
the benchmark predicts, while a high discount rate explains the unusually low fertility in Moldova.
Residual high levels of schooling in the benchmark model, which occur for example in countries
known for having e¢ cient educational systems such as the Scandinavian countries, are explained
in the model by higher complementarity in educational investments in the sense of Cunha et al.
(2006). Complementarity refers to property of the human capital production function according to
which early educational investments enhance the productivity of later investments.
Interestingly, we nd signicant di¤erences in human capital production functions even among
similar countries. Two countries with similar education spending per pupil may have di¤erent
schooling levels due to di¤erences in their human capital production functions. For example, Niger
and Burundi are among the poorest countries in our sample, with similar levels of output per-capita
and educational expenditures per pupil, but expected years of schooling are around twice as large
in Burundi. Our model rationalizes these schooling di¤erence as arising from di¤erences in human
capital technologies. Uncovering human capital production di¤erences results in novel estimates of
human capital stocks and in a re-evaluation of the role TFP di¤erences.
Our analysis yields ve main insights. First, cross-country di¤erences in TFP, age-dependent
mortality rates and public schooling policies go a long way in accounting for the overall international
quantity-quality trade-o¤. We nd that jointly these di¤erences can explain 81.6% of the standard
deviation of schooling and 77.7% of the fertility dispersion. These variables also can explain 80%
of the international quantity-quality trade-o¤ illustrated in Figure 1. In the calibrated benchmark
model, one extra child is associated with 2.5 fewer years of schooling. As mentioned, the residual
dispersion in schooling and fertility can be rationalized by introducing cross-country di¤erences in
human capital production technologies and altruism.
The second main insight refers to the role of TFP in explaining the quantity-quality trade-
o¤. We nd that while TFP is quantitatively the most important factor in accounting for the
world dispersion of fertility, its role in schooling dispersion is less clear. Equating TFP to the 90th
percentile in all countries results in a reduction of the standard deviation of fertility of 55.7%. The
key mechanism at work here is the time cost of raising children, which is increasing in TFP (wages)
for most high fertility countries. But there are poor countries, such as Niger and Pakistan, where
fertility under the counterfactual remains high, at 4.68 children per woman. The reason is that,
according to our model, the poverty of Niger and Pakistan is rooted more in its low human capital
than in its low TFP. Niger and Pakistans human capital production functions exhibit a relatively
low degree of complementarity, which results in only a marginal increase of schooling under the
counterfactual. In this respect, our TFP counterfactual suggests an important qualication to the
common view that development, in the form of higher TFP (wages), is the most important tool to
reduce fertility. What we nd is that higher wages reduce fertility the most when complementarities
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in the production of human capital are higher.
In contrast with Niger and Pakistan, there are other poor countries like Burundi, Togo and
Malawi, which exhibit very low TFP levels, but whose schooling levels that are quite close to the
sample average. The model rationalizes these countries as having relatively more complementar-
ity in human capital production: children stay in school longer in these poorer countries because
early education spending somewhat increases the productivity of later investments by more than in
other similarly low-TFP countries. Under the TFP counterfactual e¤ects are quite large for these
countries: fertility drops and schooling increases, both in large magnitudes. These large schooling
increases result in substantial gains in average schooling levels under the counterfactual. In fact,
raising TFP in all countries results in the largest average schooling increase of all counterfactuals
(19.9%), but it also results in a slight increase of the standard deviation (1.7%). The latter result
is surprising, but it reects the heterogeneity in human capital production across countries, partic-
ularly those with low TFP levels. This suggests that local, rather than global TFP counterfactual
experiments may be more informative for policy analysis.
The third main insight of the paper regards to the role of public education provision in explaining
the international quality-quantity trade-o¤. Policy makers have long advocated for education as
a key intervention to lower births per women and foster economic development. For example,
according to the World Bank Group (2011) "... the development benets of education extend well
beyond work productivity ... to include better health [and] reduced fertility ..." (p. 13). One of the
contributions of our paper is to evaluate this policy prescription within a microfounded model. We
nd that while di¤erences in the number of years of public education provision (extensive margin)
is important to explain the schooling dispersion across countries, di¤erences in public spending per
pupil are relatively more important to explain the dispersion of fertility. First, when we equate
the number of years of public provision to 13.8 years in all countries, the 90th percentile value,
the dispersion of schooling is reduced signicantly, by 38.9%, but the e¤ect on fertility rates is
minor. According to the model, children in most low schooling countries fully take advantage of
this extended period of public education except in certain countries, such as Niger, where human
capital accumulation is particularly ine¢ cient. Second, when we equate public spending per pupil
in all countries to its 90th percentile value, the dispersion of fertility is reduced by 22.6% while
the dispersion of schooling falls slightly. Overall, large educational subsidies, even if only for a
few years, induce further parental investment in education and longer schooling duration due to
the complementary properties of the human capital production function, an e¤ect that is stronger
among poorer countries. Enhanced human capital increases the time cost of children and reduces
fertility. School dispersion does not decrease much due to the strong e¤ect of this policy on the
schooling of poor countries with e¢ cient human capital accumulation. The main insight of this
counterfactual is that providing higher levels of educational subsidies, even for a limited number
of years, can become an e¤ective way of reducing fertility levels, specially for countries that can
better transform this spending into higher human capital.
The fourth main insight refers to the role of mortality. According to our analysis, reducing
working-age and retiree mortality rates, to their respective 10th percentile values, is quantitatively
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more important in reducing cross-country di¤erences in schooling and fertility than reducing child
mortality. We nd that decreasing mortality rates for those between ages 5 and 65 in all countries
results in a drop of 13.6% of the schooling dispersion, and a drop of 14.6% of the fertility dispersion.
In this case, a higher probability of surviving during working years increase the incentives to
remaining in school longer and invest in education, an e¤ect that is stronger for countries with
higher mortality rates.
More interestingly, we nd that reducing the mortality rates of retirees (above age 65) reduces
the standard deviation of schooling by 9.9% and that of fertility by 19.7%. The latter result is
particularly intriguing and underscores the role of nancial frictions in our model. If retirees live
longer, this raises welfare and the marginal benet of having children, but it also raises the value
of schooling since living longer requires nancing more years of consumption. In the presence of
nancial frictions the second e¤ect dominates, increasing human capital and the time cost of raising
children, and reducing fertility.3 We also nd that since the most important di¤erences in mortality
rates across countries are among adults and elders, reducing mortality rates for children under ve
results in only marginal changes to fertility and schooling. This result contrasts with the traditional
emphasis demographers have placed on the role of child mortality in fertility choices.
Our nal insight refers to the sources of cross-country income di¤erences. We nd a strong
role for public education variables, a lesser role for mortality variables and a less clear role for
productivity variables. Equating public educational variables to its 90th percentile results in a 44%
reduction of the cross-sectional standard deviation of log output, while equating mortality rates
to its 10th percentile results in a 9% reduction. Surprisingly, equating TFP to its 90th percentile
increases this standard deviation. This result echoes the one found for the dispersion of schooling.
While TFP di¤erences is an important factor to explain why many countries are poor or rich in
our sample, there are many countries for which di¤erences in human capital technologies are more
important. For the latter group of countries, a large increase in TFP interacts with the human
capital technology, amplifying the TFP e¤ect. The lesson here is not that TFP is not a culprit of
income di¤erences but that due to non-linearities, heterogeneity, and potential amplication e¤ects,
more local or alternative experiments could be more informative about the role of TFP. For example,
we conduct an alternative experiment in which all variables are equated across countries except for
TFP. This experiment avoids compounding and amplication e¤ects but it is less informative for
policy analysis because it does not allow for interactions with other local characteristics. In this
case we nd that TFP can produce up to 66% of the dispersion observed in the data.
In addition to the quantitative ndings on the international quantity-quality trade-o¤, our paper
also contributes to the application of innovative theoretical frameworks to cross-country compar-
isons. The theory in the paper builds on the altruistic fertility model of Barro and Becker (1988,
1989), and the cross-country mortality analysis of Becker et al.(2005). We generalize both of these
building blocks in order to better t the data. First, as in Cordoba and Ripoll (2018), we extend
the standard altruistic Barro-Becker model to introduce the elasticity of intergenerational substitu-
3Our model is consistent with Hazans (2012) evidence that higher life expectancy does not increase life-time labor
supply, since retirement is exogenous. But contrary to Hazans model, increases in life expectancy do increase human
capital. The key reason is the presence of credit frictions, which are absent in Hazans model.
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tion as a di¤erent parameter from the standard intertemporal substitution. The intergenerational
substitution parameter controls the willingness of parents to substitute consumption across gener-
ations. As we show below, this extension allows the model to better t the data on the economic
value of a child, or the total cost of raising children, as well as the cross-country negative income-
fertility relationship depicted in Figure 1. Second, as in Cordoba and Ripoll (2017), we introduce
state non-separable preferences à la Epstein-Zin-Weil to disentangle mortality risk aversion from
intertemporal substitution. The mortality risk aversion parameter is calibrated to match the value
of statistical life. As we discuss later, disentangling mortality risk aversion from intertemporal
substitution allows the value of statistical life to be proportional to income, a desirable feature
for cross-country comparisons. In particular, this proportionality eliminates the income e¤ects
introduced by the non-homothetic framework of Becker et al.(2005).
Another distinct feature of our theory is the explicit introduction of intergenerational nancial
frictions. As mentioned, these frictions stem from childrens nancial dependency from parents
during childhood years. They also capture the fact that the almost universal introduction of
compulsory schooling laws around the world has substantially curtailed the ways in which parents
used to control the income generated by children. Although not in the context of cross-country
comparisons, a few papers have examined the e¤ect of these nancial frictions, including Rangazas
(2000) in the case of schooling and human capital investment, and Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2010,
2014) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2016) in the case of fertility choice. The main implication of these
nancial frictions is that both family-level income as well as the provision of public education
play an important role in schooling and fertility choices. Relative to the cross-country literature
on fertility and schooling, our theory is unique in that it allows us to evaluate the role of public
education policies. On this dimension, our paper extends the cross-country schooling analysis in
Cordoba and Ripoll (2013) to include endogenous fertility choice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the benchmark model and
derives the optimality conditions of consumption, savings, intergenerational transfers, education
spending and fertility. Key steady state results are derived from the model. Section 3 describes the
models calibration, discussing in detail the cross-country data used in the analysis. It also discusses
the models performance and the need to introduce additional heterogeneity across countries in order
to perfectly t the data for the purpose of counterfactuals. Section 4 presents all our main results
including counterfactual exercises, developing accounting, and some robustness checks. Section 5
concludes.
2 BENCHMARK MODEL
We model a representative dynasty in each country, with a parent who is altruistic towards his
children. A representative individual in this economy faces a stochastic life span with the time-0
probability of surviving up to age a given by  (a). Time is continuous. Prices are assumed to be
actuarially fair. In particular, assume q(a) = e ra (a) is the age-contingent actuarially fair price,
with r the interest rate.
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The focus of the analysis is on the decisions of the individual over the life cycle, in particular
schooling, educational investments, consumption, saving, fertility, and transfers to children. An
individual is a student from age 6 until an endogenously chosen age s. Public subsidies for attending
school are available in the economy from ages 6 to s. After completing schooling at age s the
individual becomes a worker until he retires at age R. At age F > s he becomes a parent to n
children. Children depend on parental resources for consumption and educational investments until
they nish school.
2.1 Individuals problem
2.1.1 Preferences
We build on Cordoba and Ripoll (2017, 2018) who provide insights on how to extend life-cycle
models to study fertility and mortality. In particular, consider the following generalized version
of the Barro-Becker and Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences. The lifetime utility of the representative
individual, V , is given by
V =
C1 
1   + (n)V
0;  2 (0; 1) ; (1)
where
C =
8<:
h

R1
0 e
 a (a)
1 
1  c (a)1  da
i 1
1 
+ C if  > 0 and  6= 1
exp
h

R1
0 e
 a

1
1  ln (a) + ln c (a)

da
i
+ C if  = 1
: (2)
Let us explain each of the components of preferences in turn. In equation (1) C corresponds
to selsh utility, the utility the individual derives from his own lifetime consumption. Absent
children, C would be the only source of utility. According to equation (1), individuals also enjoy
the utility of their children. The total utility derived from n children is given by (n)V 0, where
(n) is an altruistic weight and V 0 is the lifetime utility of each of the children. Function  ()
satises  (0) = 0, 0 (n) > 0, 00 (n) < 0 and  (n) < 1 for n 2 [0; n] where n is the maximum
feasible number of children. Parameter  controls the willingness to substitute consumption among
parents and their children. Following Cordoba and Ripoll (2018), we call 1= the elasticity of
intergenerational substitution. The restriction  2 (0; 1) is required for children to be goods rather
than bads.4
Equation (2) describes selsh utility C. Parameter  is the discount factor, c(a) is consumption
at age a, 1= is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS),  2 (0; 1) is the coe¢ cient of
risk aversion, in this case aversion to mortality risk, and C > 0 is non-market consumption. The
restriction on  guarantees that longevity is a good rather than a bad.5
The following are three distinct aspects of selsh utility C. First, the formulation separates
4Cordoba and Ripoll (2011, 2018) consider the general case   0:
5Cordoba and Ripoll (2017) consider the general case   0:
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intertemporal substitution from (mortality) risk aversion. Parameter  controls the former, while 
controls the latter. When  =  equation (2) reduces to the standard expected utility formulation,
case in which marginal rates of substitution are linear in survival probabilities  (a). Cordoba and
Ripoll (2017) show that a model that separates  from  can more successfully account for evidence
on the willingness to pay for longevity and other evidence from the medical literature.6 In our
context, mortality risk a¤ects fertility decisions to the extent that it a¤ects the longevity of the
child. Here we adopt the same exible representation with the value of  determined from the
observed degree of consumption smoothing over the life cycle and  determined from estimates of
the value of statistical life in the health literature.
Second, the non-homotheticity introduced by non-market consumption C is necessary to create
a link between fertility and a countrys level of income. As discussed in Cordoba and Ripoll (2016),
in the homothetic case both the marginal benet and the marginal cost of having children are
proportional to wages, eliminating the e¤ect of income on fertility. The presence of C breaks
this proportionality. As shown below, the presence of C > 0 together with the restriction 0 <
 < 1 allows the model to be consistent with the inverse relationship between income and fertility
documented in the cross-country data.7
Third, our preferences also separate intertemporal from intergenerational substitution. From
equations (1) and (2) it can be seen that when  =  the standard dynastic representation is
obtained. Cordoba and Ripoll (2016, 2018) show that separating  from  is important for dynastic
models to be consistent both with the economic value of a child, and with the negative income-
fertility relationship documented within and across countries.8
It is important to notice that our representation of preferences in (1) and (2) is quite general
and exible. It includes as a special case the expected utility version of the dynastic model, which
is obtained when  =  =  and C = 0. In this case the model reduces to the Becker and Barro
(1988) framework under the additional assumption that  () is isoelastic.
2.1.2 Human capital
The individual accumulates human capital by going to school and investing resources in education.
Expenditures in education at age a, e(a), are composed of a public subsidy, ep(a), and private
education spending, es(a)  0. We assume that the public subsidy is given by ep between ages 6
and a maximum age of s :
ep(a) =
(
ep if 6  a  s
0 otherwise
: (3)
6Additional insights and technical details on the advantages of disentangling  from  can be found in Section 2
of Cordoba and Ripoll (2017). A cross-country comparison application is in their Section 4.1.
7Notice from equation (2) that C is a reduced-form way of capturing non-market consumption. This term is
only introduced to break the proportionality in the optimality condition for fertility. In a more general formulation,
C should also be a function of the age-dependent probability of survival. Since C=C turns out to be small in the
calibration, and since the more general formulation complicates the utility function without adding much to the
analysis, we introduce C as a reduced-form parameter in (2).
8See Section 2 in Cordoba and Ripoll (2018).
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We allow for cross-country di¤erences in s, ep, as well in the relative price of education goods,
pE : As summarized in Lee and Barro (2001), there is evidence that cross-country di¤erences in
educational resources per pupil, which include higher teacher salaries and instructional materials,
are important in explaining di¤erences in student achievement. Let E be a vector of educational
expenditures for all ages. At the end of s years of schooling human capital is given by
h (s;E) =
Z s
0
(d  e(a)) da
=
; (4)
where
e(a) =
ep(a) + es(a)
pE
:
The human capital production function in equation (4) is a version of Ben-Porath (1967). Parameter
 2 (0; 1] determines the degree of substitution among educational investments at di¤erent ages;
 2 (0; 1] determines the returns to scale; and d is the fraction of school non-repeaters. The
restriction on  guarantees that @h(s;E)@s > 0. Parameter d is introduced to account for di¤erences
in repetition rates across countries and to avoid overestimating human capital by double-counting
expenditures.
Self-productivity and complementarity To better understand our human capital production
function, we follow Cunha et al. (2006) and characterize its properties in terms of self-productivity
and complementarity. For this purpose, consider for a moment the discrete-time version of the
time-derivate of equation (4). It satises the following version of Ben-Poraths (1967) formulation
9
h(a+ 1) = zhh(a)
1(d  e(a))2 + (1  h)h(a)  g(h(a); e(a)) + (1  h)h(a) (5)
where g(h(a); e(a))  zhh(a)1(d  e(a))2 is the gross educational investment, and (1  h)h(a)
is undepreciated human capital. Our representation in (4) assumes h = 0 and normalizes the
ability parameter zh = 1.10 Finally, the mapping between parameters in (4) and (5) is given by
1  1  = and 2  .
Following Cunha et al. (2006), self-productivity corresponds to the notion that human capital
at certain age raises human capital at later age. From this perspective, self-productivity arises
when
@h(a+ 1)
@h(a)
= 1h(a)
1 1(d  e(a))2 + 1  h > 0:
Since we assume h = 0, self-productivity holds when 1  1   = > 0, i.e., when h(a) has a
positive e¤ect in gross educational investment h(a)1(d  e(a))2 . In the calibration we verify that
= < 1, conrming that our human capital production function exhibits self-productivity.
9See derivation and discussion in Cordoba and Ripoll (2013).
10We normalize zh = 1 because we consider a representative dynasty per country. As we discuss below in the
calibration, introducing cross-country di¤erences in studentsability zh is not quantitatively relevant in explaining
schooling di¤erences.
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Complementarity captures the notion that early educational investments facilitate the produc-
tivity of later investments. Complementarity arises when
@2g(h(a); e(a))
@h(a)@e(a)
= 12h(a)
1 1 (d  e(a))2 1 > 0;
in other words, there is complementarity when human capital stock h(a) raises the marginal pro-
ductivity of educational investments, @g(h(a); e(a))=@e(a). Again, since 2   > 0, then comple-
mentarity holds when 1  1  = > 0 or = < 1, which we verify in our calibration.
The notions of self-productivity and complementarity underscore the role of parameter  in
(4). The lower the value of , or as  ! 0, the higher the degrees of self-productivity and
complementarity. We exploit this insight below when we explore a version of our model in which
countries di¤er in . We nd that di¤erences in  are necessary to quantitatively explain cross-
country schooling di¤erences. We also nd that countries known to be good at producing human
capital, like Scandinavian countries, exhibit lower calibrated s.
Returns to schooling The returns to schooling implied by (4) are given by
rs(s) =
@ lnh (s;E)
@s
=


h (s;E)
 
 (d  e(s)) ;
which are decreasing in h (s;E) and increasing education expenditures at age s, e(s).
It is instructive to consider for a moment the special case e(a) = e: In that case, equation (4)
simplies to h (s;E) = (de)s= which makes clear the role of  and :  is the elasticity of human
capital with respect to expenditures, while = the elasticity with respect to years of schooling.
Returns to schooling in that case are given by rs(s) = (=)(1=s), which highlights the role of =
and s as its key determinants.
Returns to experience Beyond schooling years, human capital is also enhanced through expe-
rience. In particular, we assume that human capital at age R  a  s is given by
h(a; s;E) = h (s;E) e(a s); (6)
where  are the returns to experience.
2.1.3 Lifetime income and labor supply
The present value of the individuals lifetime income, in age-0 prices, is given by
W (s; n;E) =
Z R
s
wh (s;E) e(a s)l(n; a)q(a)da;
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where w is the after-tax wage per unit of human capital. Labor supply at age a is given by l(n; a):
It is a function of n, as parents incur time costs in raising children.
2.1.4 Budget constraints
There are two stages during the lifetime of an individual: schooling years and working years,
including retirement. We assume that individuals fully depend on parental resources during the
rst stage of life. Let b1 denote the present value of this parental support in age-0 prices. The
budget constraint for the rst stage of life reads
b1 
Z s
0
(c (a) + es (a)) q (a) da: (7)
The assumption that during schooling years individuals totally depend on parental resources is
natural for the average school-age child in each country. In practice, the typical school-age child
cannot access nancial markets. Parents have access to nancial markets but cannot substitute
for banks, particularly as lenders, because childrens debt obligations are not enforceable.11 A key
issue is whether altruistic parents will transfer enough resources to each child as to perfectly smooth
their consumption between the student and the working periods.
The budget constraint for the second stage of life, which starts at age s; reads
W (s; n;E) + q (s) b2 
Z 1
s
c (a) q (a) da+ 
Z R
s
q (a) da+ q (F )nb01 + q
 
F + s0

nb02; (8)
where b2 is the present value (in age-s prices) of the transfers the (adult) child receives from the
parent during the childs working years. In turn, b01 and b02 are the transfers the child will give
to each of his own n children for their schooling and working years respectively. Finally,  is a
lump-sum tax used to nance public education.
Parental transfers are assumed to be non-negative. This restriction is not binding for b01 since
positive transfers to school-age children are the only way to guarantee positive consumption of
children during school years, so we only write the constraint that
b02  0: (9)
This constraint prevents parents from endowing their adult children with debt. When the present
value of the childs future income is larger than the cost of raising the child, altruistic parents
would nd it optimal to have the maximum number of children and endow them with debt to
compensate for the costs incurred during schooling years, and to extract rents from them.12 As we
11Others in the literature have emphasized the importance of this type of frictions in modeling intergenerational
links. See Schoondbroot and Tertilt (2010, 2014) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2016).
12 In contrast with the binding constraint in equation (9), Barro and Becker (1989) focus on unconstrained solutions.
They avoid the situation in which parents would like to have the maximum number of children and endow them with
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show below, in equilibrium constraint (9) binds and parents do not transfer enough resources to
perfectly smooth the consumption of their children between their two stages of life.
2.2 Optimal allocations
Given parental transfers, b1 and b2, taxes and prices, we describe the individuals problem recur-
sively as follows
V (b1; b2) = max
[c(a)]1t=0;b
0
1;b
0
2;[es(a)]
s
t=0;s;n2[0;n]
1
1  C
1  + (n)V
 
b01; b
0
2

;
subject to (7), (8), (4), and (9). We use superscript  to denote optimal solutions and focus the
presentation on steady state situations, i.e., b1 = b01 and b2 = b02 . The Appendix includes a detailed
model solution.
2.2.1 Optimal consumption and parental transfers
Let 1 and 2 be the Lagrange multipliers associated to the budget constraints (7) and (8) respec-
tively. Let cS (s) and cW (s) denote consumption at time s as a student and as a worker respectively.
Optimal consumption over the life cycle satises the following pair of conditions
c (a) =
h
e(r )a (a)
 
1 
i 1

c (0) ; for a  s; and (10)
c (a) =
h
e(r )a (a)
 
1  G
i 1

c (0) for s  a (11)
where
G  1
2
=

cW (s)
cS (s)

: (12)
G is a key measure of relative scarcity, or the shadow price of student-age resources relative to
working-age resources. Equations (10) and (11) are standard Euler equations, except for two
features. First, the survival probability term  (a)
 
1  a¤ects the growth rate of consumption.
Notice that in the case of the expected utility model with  = , this term disappears. Here,
if  > , which we nd to be the case in the calibration, higher survival rates result in lower
consumption growth, a prediction absent in the standard case with  = . Second, term G in (11)
describes the extent of the credit frictions in the model, mainly the role of the non-negative bequest
constraints. In the absence of credit frictions, G = 1. According to (12), G measures the extent of
the consumption jump at age s when the student becomes a worker.
Parental transfers ultimately determine the degree of credit frictions. The optimality conditions
debt by assuming that children are a net nancial cost to parents (i.e., the cost of raising the child is larger than the
present value of the childs future income). See Cordoba and Ripoll (2016) for a detailed discussion.
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for transfers, b01 and b02, are
parent2 q(F )n
 = (n)child1 and (13)
parent2 q(F + s
)n > (n)
child
2 q(s
); (14)
where we have written (14) for the case in which (9) binds and b02 = 0. In what follows we write the
model solution assuming this is the case, and later verify it in the calibrated model. The left-hand
side of (13) and (14) are the marginal costs of transfers while the right hand side are the marginal
benets, to the parents.
To gain some further understanding, (13) can be written in the steady-state as
c (F )  =
1
e F (F )
1 
1 
(n)
n
c(0) :
This equation corresponds to the intergenerational version of the Euler equation, equalizing the
marginal utilities of the parent at age F and the child at age 0. Notice how average altruism
(n)=n plays a key role weighting the marginal utility of the child.
In the steady state conditions (13) and (14) simplify to
G 

cW (s)
cS (s)

= G(n) = e rF (F )
n
(n)
; (15)
and
G (n) >
 (F ) (s)
 (F + s)
: (16)
In a perpetual youth model,  (F ) (s) =  (F + s) so that, in that case, a binding transfer
constraint is equivalent to G (n) > 1 according to (16). Our calibrated model below allows for
higher child mortality than parental mortality so that  (F + s) >  (F ) (s) : In that case, G > 1
is a su¢ cient condition for a binding transfer constraint.
The determination of G (n) is described in equation (15). It depends directly on parameters r;
(F ) and the altruistic function  () : More importantly, it depends directly on the fertility choice
and indirectly on the parameters determining n. G (n) > 1 is more likely to hold when n is large,
the interest rate is low and/or average altruism, (n)=n, is low. This means that parental transfers,
even from altruistic parents, may not be enough to fully smooth the childrens consumption when
family size is large, altruism is low, or when low interest rates make it optimal to consume earlier. In
particular, the model predicts that, other things equal, countries with larger fertility will have larger
credit frictions. In those countries, children would receive less parental transfers and experience a
larger consumption jump at age s.
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2.2.2 Educational expenditures
The optimality condition for private educational expenditures, es(a), is given by
q (a)  1
G (n)
Z R
s
w
@h (s;E)
@es(a)
e(a s
)l(n; a)q(a)da; (17)
which holds with equality if es(a) > 0. In an interior solution this expression equates the marginal
cost of spending one unit of consumption goods in education at age a, q(a), with the marginal
benet, which corresponds to the increase in human capital. This benet is discounted by the rate
1=G because benets are realized during the second stage of life when resources are less scarce,
while the cost is paid in the rst stage when resources are more scarce. From this perspective, in
countries with higher fertility and higher G, the benets to educational investments are reduced.
In addition to private educational expenditures, es(a), public education subsidies ep are provided
yearly from age 6 to age s. Since public and private investments are perfect substitutes in the human
capital production function, then if ep is higher than the optimal total educational investments,
then es(a) = 0 and there is "pure public education." Let e^ (a) be the optimal amount of total
expenditure on education when es(a) > 0. Then the optimal educational investment e (a) is the
maximum between e^ (a) and ep as given by,
e (a) = max fe^ (a) ; epg for 0 < a < s: (18)
Notice that during pre-school years and after age s, educational investments are only private, or
e(a) = es(a). As we explain in the calibration, cross-country di¤erences in s are quite signicant,
varying from as little as 11 to 22. One of the objectives of this paper is to quantify the extent
to which these large di¤erences in provision of public education play a role in explaining the
international quantity-quality trade-o¤.
2.2.3 Schooling
The optimality condition for schooling years is given by
es (s) + c
S (s)
G (n)1= 1   1
1=   1 =
1
q (s)G (n)
Ws (s
; n;E) +

G (n)
for  6= 1; or (19)
es(s
) + cS(s) ln(G (n)) =
1
q (s)G (n)
Ws (s
; n;E) +

G (n)
for  = 1: (20)
The marginal cost of an extra year of schooling is given by the additional private education expen-
ditures incurred, es(s), plus the cost of waiting one extra year at a level of student consumption
cS(s), which is lower than that of a worker when G > 1. In this respect, credit frictions increase
the marginal cost of schooling. The marginal benets of an extra year of schooling are given by
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the additional lifetime income Ws (s; n;E), plus the lump-sum tax payment avoided from not
working that year,  . Both components of the marginal benet are discounted by G. As in the
case of optimal educational expenditures, this discount captures the fact that more schooling in-
crease resources in the second stage of life when resources are less scarce. Equation (19) describes a
quantity-quality trade-o¤: ceteris paribus, countries with higher fertility will have higher G, which
would tend to decrease their optimal level of schooling. This prediction stems from the role of
credit frictions in the model.
Turning to other determinants of schooling, notice that higher probabilities of survival increase
the marginal benet of schooling through their e¤ect on lifetime income W (s; n;E). Higher wages,
w, increase both the marginal cost and the marginal benet of schooling: on the cost side, higher
wages increase parental transfers to children, who will in turn spend more in education and con-
sumption. On the benet side, higher wages increase lifetime income W (s; n;E) in a proportional
way. The net e¤ect will depend on the relative increase of marginal cost and benets. We discuss
this in Proposition 1 below after presenting the optimal fertility choice.
2.2.4 Fertility
Assume parameters are such that the solution for fertility is interior. We check that this is the case
in the numerical results. In steady state, the optimality condition for fertility is given by
q (F ) b01 + q (F + s
) b02  Wn (s; n;E) = n(n)
V (b01 ; b02 )
2
; (21)
where 2 is the marginal utility of parental consumption at age F as given by
2 = C
 (C   C)e(r )F (F )  1  c (F )  :
Expression (21) equates the marginal costs and benets of a child. The marginal costs are the
resources parents transfer to the child, b01 and b02, plus the time costs of raising the child, which
result in lower labor supply and lifetime income as given by  Wn (s; n;E). The marginal benet
corresponds to the lifetime utility of the child V (b01; b02), weighted by marginal altruism toward the
last child, n(n), and normalized by 2, which expresses the marginal benet in terms of parental
consumption units.
According to (21) the time costs of raising children are lower for parents with lower human
capital. This is one of the mechanisms that generates a steady state with larger families and lower
levels of schooling, a quantity-quality trade-o¤. Regarding other determinants of fertility, higher
probabilities of survival increase the marginal benet of children through their positive e¤ect on
lifetime utility V (b01; b02), and also decrease the marginal cost of children as the time spent raising
them becomes a smaller fraction of lifetime income W (s; n;E).
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2.2.5 E¤ects of wages on schooling and fertility
Of particular interest is the e¤ect of wages, w, on schooling and fertility choices. In the general
equilibrium, wages reect total factor productivity levels. Equations (19) and (21) indicate that
higher wages increase the marginal benets as well as the marginal costs of schooling and of children.
The net e¤ect depends on the models features, particularly on the presence of non-homothetic
utility and public education provision as we summarize in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Optimal fertility and schooling are independent of wages if: (i) the utility function
in (2) is homothetic, e.g. C = 0; and (ii) there is no public education: ep =  = 0 for all a.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, schooling and fertility choices are independent of wages when the marginal costs
and benets are proportional to w. As discussed above, higher wages increase both the costs and
benets of schooling and fertility, but if the increase is proportional, the e¤ect of wages cancels out.
To see why both requirements in Proposition 1 eliminate the e¤ect of wages on n and s, rewrite
(19) and (21) as (see Appendix for details)
es (s)
W 
+
cS (s)
W 
G(n)1= 1   1
1=   1 =
1
G(n)
1
q (s)
Ws (s
; n;E)
W 
; (22)
and
q(F )
b1
W 
  Wn(s
; n;E)
W 
(23)
=
n(n
)
1   (n)
G (n) =
1  

4 (s
; n) c (0) =W  + C=W 
(
4 (s; n))
:
where 
4 (s; n) is a function only of s and n. Absent public education, expenditure variables such
as es (s) ; cS (s) ; b1 and c (0), as well as W s and W n are all homogeneous of degree one in W : As
a result, ratios es (s) =W ; cS (s) =W ; b1=W , c (0) =W ; Ws=W  and Wn=W  are all homogenous
of degree zero in W . If C = 0 then W ; and in particular wages, w, do not enter in the two
equations above determining s and n. In other words, in the pure homothetic version of the model
with pure private education, "time" variables s and n, are orthogonal to "money" variables.
The pure homothetic model with pure private education is unable to account for the negative
fertility-income relationship suggested by the data. Our approach to recover such relationship is to
introduce the non-homothetic term C: According to equation (23), term C increases the marginal
benet of having children. This is because C acts as a public good that delivers utility to any alive
person beyond private consumption C   C. Moreover, what matters for fertility choice is C=W .
This means that the term is large for poorer countries, countries with low human wealth, but less
signicant for rich countries. Thus, the incentives to have children are stronger in poor rather than
in rich countries whenever C > 0:
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Even when C = 0, fertility could also depend indirectly on w through the schooling choice in
the presence of public education. To see this, notice that when there is public provision so that
ep > 0 and  > 0, then the marginal benet on the right-hand-side of (20) is not proportional to
wages because  does not directly depend on w. In our calibration, however, this e¤ect is not strong
enough.
2.3 Closing the model
2.3.1 Demographics
Consider a steady-state with constant population growth and a stationary distribution of people
by age. Let gn be the constant growth rate of population. The steady-state density of age-a people
is given by
~n(a)  N(a)
N
=
e gna(a)R1
0 e
 gna(a)da
; (24)
where N(a) is the population of age a and N the total population. Since birth rates are endogenous
in the model, with n children born when the parent is age F , then population growth gn must satisfy
the following relationship
n(F ) = egnF ;
where recall that parents survives to age F with probability (F ).
2.3.2 Government
The only role of the government in this model is to provide public education subsidies in the amount
of ep per pupil up to age s. The government collects lump-sum taxes from workers in order to pay
for education spending, so that the government budget constraint is given by

Z R
s
~n (a) da = ep
Z min(s;s)
6
~n (a) da;
where ep is exogenous, ~n (a) is endogenous as it depends on the fertility rate through gn, and  is
computed as a residual to balance the budget.
2.3.3 Production
We assume each country is a small open economy facing an exogenous interest rate r. In this
respect interest rates di¤erentials play no role in our theory, consistent with the ndings of Caselli
and Feyrer (2007). The production function is a standard Cobb-Douglas of the form
Y = K (AH)1  ; (25)
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with 0 <  < 1, where Y is output, K is the capital stock, A is TFP and H is aggregate human
capital. The small-open economy assumption implies that the ratio K= (AH) is equalized across
countries, since
r = 

K
AH
 1
: (26)
The after-tax wage per unit of human capital is given by
w = (1  )(1  )

K
AH

A = (1  )(1  ) (=r) 1  A; (27)
so that di¤erences in w across countries reect di¤erences in TFP, A, as well as di¤erences in tax
rates,  . Exogenous tax rate  , which is di¤erent from  , is introduced for two purposes: rst, since
tax rates vary across countries, we want to use after-tax labor income in the model to properly
measure the actual disposable resources for representative individual in each country. Second, since
TFP is computed as a residual, controlling for di¤erences across countries in  results in a more
accurate productivity measure.
3 CALIBRATION
In this section we calibrate the model to international data. For this purpose, specic functional
forms for the altruistic function, (n); and labor supply, l(n; a), are required. Following Cordoba
et. al. (2016), we use an exponential function for  () of the form13
(n) = e F (F )
1 
1   (1  e n): (28)
This altruistic weight has three components: the rst is time discounting, e F , as all children
are assumed to be born when the parent is age F . The second is the survival probability to age
F ,  (F )
1 
1  . As we show below,  is a key parameter determining the model-implied value of
statistical life.14 The last component, function  (1   e n), describes how the altruistic weight
13Cordoba et. al. (2016) compare the exponential formulation of (n) with the Barro-Becker formulation of the
form
(n) = e F (F )
1 
1  1
1  "n
1
1 " :
They favor (28) because it exhibits a stronger degree of diminishing altruism, helping the model better match the
fertility data.
14The reader may wonder why in the altruistic function in equation (28) the exponent for (F ) is given by
(1   )=(1   ), while the exponent for (a) in equation (2) is given by (1   )=(1   ). To understand why, it
is useful to consider the following monotonic transformation of V in equation (1): W = [(1  )V ]1=(1 ). In this
case, equation (1) can be written as:
W =
h
C1  + e F (F )
1 
1   (1  e n)  V 01 i 11  :
This CES representation of lifetime utility is analogous to the that of C in (2). As shown below, deriving the value
of statistical life in the model requires taking the derivative of W with respect to . In that derivative, the power
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depends on the number of children:  is the level of altruism, and parameter  controls the degree
of diminishing altruism. This last component is analogous to the exponential time discount, except
that now the discount is on children and it depends on how many are born.
As for the labor supply, we consider the simple form
l(n; a) =
(
1  
h
(n+ )   
i
if a > F
1 otherwise
;
where 
h
(n+ )   
i
, with 0 <  < 1, is the time cost of having n children. This time cost
function implies that when n = 0 the cost is zero, and that the marginal time cost is decreasing on
the number of children as governed by .15
We calibrate the model to a sample of countries with the most recent available data, typically
2013. Data availability determines a sample size of 92 countries. Table 1 presents summary statistics
for the main variables of interest in our sample. We will comment on Table 1 below along with our
calibration strategy. We assume some parameters are country-specic, while others are common
across countries as we now describe.
3.1 Country-specic parameters
Countries di¤er along key exogenous dimensions, allowing us to quantitatively evaluate the role of
a number of factors on schooling and fertility choices. In particular, countries di¤er on mortality
rates, f(a)g10 , public education subsidies ep, the age until which public provision is available, s,
school repetition rates, (1  d), relative price of education, pE , tax rates,  , and TFP.
3.1.1 Mortality
In modeling the survival probabilities we are make a compromise between computational conve-
nience and realism. We assume the following representation for  (a),
 (a) =
8><>:
e p1a for a  a1
 (a1) e
 p2(a a1) for a1  a  a2
 (a2) e
 p3(a a2) for a2  a
:
Since we are interested in evaluating the role of mortality on fertility and schooling, in the equation
above we introduce three separate periods to allow for di¤erent hazard (mortality) rates for young
children, students and workers, and retirees. We set a1 = 5, so that p1 is the hazard rate for young
adults. We also set a2 = 65 so that p2 is the hazard rate for students and workers, and p3 is that
for retirees.
1=(1  ) on the bracket above cancels the term (1  ) of the exponent on (F ). As a result, the value of statitiscal
life is determined by (1  ). Similar argument applies to C in (2).
15As in Becker and Barro (1988), time costs here are meant to capture the costs over the lifetime of the parent.
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We calibrate p1, p2, and p3 for each country in the sample. For this purpose we use the life tables
from the World Population Prospects for the period 2010-2015 and extract the survival probabilities
by 5-year age intervals. Parameters p1, p2, and p3 are calibrated to survival probabilities  (5),
 (65), and  (85). As can be seen in Table 1, the cross-country dispersion on survival probabilities
across countries increases with age.
We obtain reasonable survival proles for all countries. Figure 2 plots survival probabilities
by age for selected countries. While the calibration underpredicts survival in earlier years and
overpredicts in later years, the overall t is reasonable.
3.1.2 Schooling
We use UNESCO data to document di¤erences in public education provision around the world. On
this margin the two key variables are s and ep. We also allow for di¤erences in school repetition
rates across countries, 1 d, in order to measure human capital more accurately in (4). The measure
of s in the data should capture the number of years a representative child in each country receives
public education subsidies. We then construct s using information on the percentage of students
enrolled in public education institutions at di¤erent levels, primary, secondary and tertiary, as well
as the duration of each of these levels, as follows,
s = duration primary net public enrollment primary rate
+duration secondary net public enrollment secondary rate
+(SLE   duration primary  duration secondary) net public enrollment tertiary net,
where SLE is school life expectancy, our measure of schooling in the model. UNESCO measures the
SLE as the total number of years of schooling a child expects to receive in each country, assuming
that the probability of being enrolled in school equals the current enrollment ratio for each age.
Therefore, for a child of age 6 the SLE is given by
SLE6 =
IX
i=6
enrollmenti
populationi
 100;
where I is a theoretical upper age-limit for schooling. Table 1 reports summary statistics for SLE
in our sample, which has a mean of 13.86 years. Although there has been substantial increase
in school enrollment rates in poor countries, large di¤erences in SLE still remain, with the 90th
percentile at 17.8 years and the 10th percentile at 10.4 years.
Our measure of s captures the extent to which children enroll in public schools. In constructing
s we take into account the cases of some countries in the sample, like Belgium and Chile, where
subsidies to religious private schools or the existence of universal vouchers make public school
enrollment an inaccurate measure of the fraction of students who receive education subsidies. In
these cases we use UNESCOs compulsory schooling to construct s. Figure 3 plots our measure of s
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against SLE. All countries fall below the 45-degree line indicating that a representative child in each
country receives public education subsidies only for a fraction of the SLE years. Figure 3 suggests
a positive correlation between s and SLE and a large dispersion across countries in the provision
of public education. The average s in the sample is 9.64 years, while the standard deviation is 3.26
years.
We compute public education subsidies ep in each country as
ep =
government educational expenditures
pupils enrolled in public institutions
;
which measures the average subsidy received by pupils enrolled in all levels of public education.
Since in the model we have a representative student per country, measuring ep this way captures
the average public subsidy available to this student in each school grade. Table 1 reports summary
statistics for ep in our sample. The cross-country dispersion is substantial: while the mean is $6,601,
the standard deviation is $7,091 (PPP). Figure 4 plots ep against GDP per capita in log-10 scale,
suggesting a strong correlation (88.8%).
The UNESCO measure of government educational expenditures is PPP adjusted, but does not
capture di¤erences in the relative price of education good across countries, pE . In order to check
whether di¤erences in the relative price of education goods play a role, we proxy pE with the
2011 relative prices of government goods from the Penn World Tables (PWT). Relative prices of
education goods are available from the 1996 PWT benchmark data, but for a smaller sample of
countries. Since the correlation of education and government prices in the benchmark data is high,
in the order of 80%, using government prices to proxy education prices is reasonable.16 Table 1
reports summary statistics for our proxy measure of pE . It turns out that in the data the correlation
between pE and GDP per capita is -34.6%, suggesting that education is relatively more expensive
than consumption goods in poorer countries. Therefore the dispersion of education expenditures
per pupil across countries is even larger than what Figure 4 suggests.
Last, school repetition rates across countries are constructed from UNESCO data. Data is
available for the percentage of repeaters in primary and early secondary. An average measure
of repetition is constructed using the country-specic duration of primary and secondary as a
fraction of the SLE. Since repetition is measured only for "early" secondary, we half the duration
of secondary to compute average repetition rates. Table 1 reports summary statistics for repetition
rates: while the average is only 3.7%, the standard deviation is 5.6%. Repetition rates tend to be
very high in Africa, as much as 30.4% in certain countries (Central African Republic).
3.1.3 Wages and TFP
In order to compute country-specic wages we use output per capita in the data for 2013, ydata =
Y=N , and we construct a model-related measure of human capital for 2013, hdata. In particular,
16We check whether our results below are sensitive to our proxy of pE by directly using the price of education
goods from the 1996 PWT benchmark data for a subsample of countries. We verify our results are robust.
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from equations (25) and (26) we can write wages in any given period as
w =
(1  )(1  )ydata
hdata
; (29)
where we dene hdata to be
hdata = datah(s;E)

sdata=s
=
: (30)
In equation (29) we measure ydata from the World Development Indicators (2013, PPP) and calcu-
late  as government spending as a percent of GDP (2013, World Development Indicators) net of
government education expenditures (UNESCO). As we explain below,  is set exogenously and is
common across countries.
Notice that while hdata in (29) is the level of human capital of the workers who produced the
2013 GDP, h(s;E) in (30) is the model-implied steady-state human capital at age s. These are not
the same values because the level of schooling of the workforce in 2013 is not the same as the SLE
of the current school-age children. In fact, the data conrms a gap between the Barro-Lee schooling
for the adult population (as reported in the PWT for 2010) and the 2013 SLE from UNESCO. The
average Barro-Lee schooling in our sample is 8.41 years, while the average 2013 SLE is 13.86 years.
In equation (30) data captures the average experience of workers at the 2013 age distribution,
and sdata is the Barro-Lee schooling for the adult population in 2013. We compute data as the
weighted average of exponential functions e(a s), where  are the returns to experience as in (6).
The weights are given by the population shares reported in 5-year age intervals from the World
Population Prospects for 2013, up to retirement age R = 65.
In order to understand our strategy for computing hdata notice that if the current adult workers
had the same schooling as current students are expected to complete, or sdata = s = SLE, then
hdata = datah(s;E). Exponent = corresponds to the elasticity of human capital with respect to
schooling in (4) when expenditures are constant. In this respect = is a reasonable exponent to
adjust for the gap sdata=s in order to obtain hdata.
Last, once wages are computed, TFP for each country obtained as a residual from (27) as,
A =
w
(1  )(1  ) (=r) 1 
: (31)
3.2 Common parameters across countries
3.2.1 Exogenous parameters
The following parameters are assumed to be common across countries and are set exogenously: the
EIS, 1=; the interest rate, r; the rate of time preference, ; the capital share, ; the returns to
experience, ; the childbearing age, F ; and the retirement age; R.
Table 2 summarizes the values for these parameters. We set  = 1, a common value in the
growth and business cycles literatures. We set r = 2:5%, a standard value for a risk free rate. We
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assume r =  = 2:5%, so that consumption growth over the life cycle is determined by the survival
probabilities from equations (10) and (11). A capital share of  = 0:33 is standard. Returns to
experience is set to  = 2% implying that wages are multiplied by a factor of 2:23 after 40 years of
experience, which is consistent with estimates from Bils and Klenow (2000).
We set F = 28. Recall that in the model all children are born at the same time, so F is
the average childbearing age. According to the United NationsWorld Fertility Patterns 2015,
the average childbearing age in 2010-2015 was about 27.3 years in Asia and Latin America, 28.6
in North America, and slightly above 29 in Africa, Europe and Oceania. We set F = 28 as a
compromise and check the robustness of the results to this value.
In the case of retirement, we set R = 65, a value that binds mostly for rich countries in the
sample. This value allows us to address the concern that the positive e¤ects of longer life expectancy
in schooling may be overstated for rich countries, since individuals there do not necessarily have a
longer working life span relative to poor countries.
3.2.2 Calibrated parameters
The following parameters are also assumed to be common across countries and are calibrated
to targets from the data: the elasticity of intergenerational substitution, 1=; the parameter that
determines mortality risk aversion, ; non-market consumption, C; returns to scale of human capital
production, ; degree of substitution among education expenditures at di¤erent ages, ; the level
of altruism,  ; the degree of child discounting, ; the level parameter of the time cost of raising
children, ; the shift parameter of the time cost, ; and the elasticity of the time cost, .
Table 3 presents the calibration results. Although all parameters a¤ect the targets jointly, some
have relatively more quantitative impact in matching certain targets as we now explain. Parameter
 is calibrated to match the average schooling in the sample. As shown above in equation (23),
a lower , or a higher intergenerational substitution, results in richer countries having a lower
number of children and providing more transfers to each of them, which allows them to stay at
school longer. In this respect,  inuences both the level of schooling and fertility in the model.
We obtain  = 0:529, which implies an elasticity of intergenerational substitution of 1:81. This
is consistent with the ndings in Cordoba and Ripoll (2018), who found values of this elasticity
signicantly larger than one.
Parameter  is calibrated to match the value of statistical life (VSL) in the United States at
age F . The VSL is dened in the literature as the willingness to pay to save one life by a large pool
of identical individuals. In the model the VSL corresponds to the marginal rate of substitution
between survival and consumption. In other words, the value of remaining life at age F is given by
V SL(F ) =
@V=@ (F )
@V=@c (F )
:
As we show in the Appendix,  has a rst-order e¤ect on V SL(F ). In particular, as  ! 1 then
V SL(F )!1. As the value of statistical life in the United States has been estimated to be between
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$4 and $9 million (Viscusi and Aldi, 2003), then  must be well below one. We set a target for the
VSL on the conservative end of $4 million and obtain a calibrated  = 0:55.
As discussed above, the non-homotheticity introduced by C guarantees that wages a¤ect fertility.
We calibrate C to match the correlation between income and fertility in the data. We compute
this correlation to be  0:3 in our sample and obtain a calibrated C = 4; 500.
Regarding the human capital production function, we calibrate  to match the average private
educational expenditures as a fraction of GDP among OECD countries in the sample, and  to
match returns to schooling in the US.17 As reported by the National Center of Education Statistics,
in OECD countries private education spending was on average 0.9% of GDP in 2014. We obtain
 = 0:282 and  = 0:164. These parameters are similar to those obtained in Cordoba and Ripoll
(2013), and consistent with the large human capital literature discussed therein.
The altruistic function, (n) =  (1   e n), plays a key role in determining the amount
parents transfer to children for consumption and education expenditures during childhood. We
then calibrate  to match the goods costs of raising a child (consumption and education) as a
percentage of mean family lifetime income in the US. Using information in Lino (2012) on the
costs of raising children from the US Department of Agriculture we set this target to 16.44%. We
compute this target using information from families in the low-income bracket, whose upper-bound
corresponds to the median family income in the US. Since our model includes college costs, we
adjust the Lino (2012) cost computation by adding costs of attending public colleges. We obtain
 = 0:54.
Regarding , which determines the degree of child discounting, we select as a target the standard
deviation of schooling. Since  drives marginal altruism, it plays a role in determining both fertility
and schooling. In this respect both  and  are determinants of rst and second moments of the
fertility and schooling distributions. We obtain  = 2:36, although the calibrated model cannot
fully account for the standard deviation of schooling.
Last are the parameters in the time cost of children function, 
h
(n+ )   
i
. Parameter
 is a key determinant of the level of fertility, so we calibrate it to match average fertility in the
sample. We obtain  = 2:9. Parameters  and  are calibrated to other moments of the distribution
of schooling and fertility: the minimum fertility and the maximum schooling in the sample. We
obtain  = 1:84 and  = 0:2.
3.3 Models t
As can be seen in Table 3, the calibrated benchmark model is able to match most targets quite well,
but it cannot fully account for the standard deviation of schooling as well as the minimum fertility
and the maximum schooling. Figure 5 portrays the fertility and schooling predictions of the model
relative to the data. The overall model performance is quite good: the correlation between the
data and the model is 78.8% for fertility and 82.1% for schooling. Similarly, the benchmark model
17We use the average private educational expenditures as a fraction of GDP among OECD countries because the
United States is somewhat atypical among rich countries in this dimension. While the OECD average is 0.9%, in the
United States the corresponding number is 2%.
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explains 81.6% of the standard deviation of schooling and 77.7% of the fertility dispersion.
Table 4 reports untargeted moments to evaluate the models performance along other dimen-
sions. Regarding the main focus of this paper, the quantity-quality trade o¤, the model explains
roughly 80% of the negative correlation between schooling and fertility in the data, an substantial
fraction. At the same time, and as seen in Figure 5, the model predicts more schooling than the
minimum observed and less fertility than the maximum observed. Last, the model predicts that
the time cost of raising children is within the range of that in the data. Using the same strategy as
in Cordoba and Ripoll (2016, 2018), we compute the time costs of raising children to be between 60
and 75% of the total costs, which results in time costs being between 19 and 32% of family lifetime
income in the US.18 The calibrated model implies this number to be 25.4%, within the interval in
the data.
3.4 Full model
For the purpose of counterfactual exercises we introduce additional cross-country heterogeneity so
that the model exactly matches schooling and fertility for each country in the sample. Specically,
we extend our benchmark model by introducing cross-country heterogeneity in  to exactly match
fertility, and in  to exactly match schooling for each country in the sample. We call this the
full model. We maintain the same calibrated parameters of Tables 2 and 3, and we compute
the deviations of  and  from the calibrated benchmark that would be needed for each country
to exactly t the data. Specically, for a country i, i = benchmark  i and similarly i =
benchmark  i. It is important to emphasize that these is and is are introduced to explain the
residual di¤erence between the benchmark model and the data, and can only be interpreted in this
context.19
To understand the role of country-specic i recall that this parameter plays an important role
in determining the marginal benet of children in equation (23). Therefore, countries for which the
benchmark model predicts lower fertility than in the data in Figure 5, such as the US, Switzerland,
Australia, Mexico, Pakistan, Niger, and Mali, among others, would require i < 1 so that the
marginal benet of a additional child does not fall as fast and the model is able to predict a larger
number of children exactly as in the data. In contrast, countries like Moldova, Bangladesh and
Lesotho require i > 1.
The country-specic is introduce di¤erences in the human capital production function across
countries. As discussed above, countries with lower i would be better at producing human capital,
18As explained in Cordoba and Ripoll (2016) this range depends on whether only active time taking care of
children is taken into account, or also passive time (time spent in the presence of children surpervising, but not
directly engaged). The range of costs also depend on whether hours are priced at the nannys wage or the median
wage. These di¤erent ways of computing time costs result in a range of 19 to 32% of family lifetime income in the
US.
19 It is not possible to exactly match the data by introducting cross-country heterogeneity in parameters that would
only shift the human capital and altruistic functions. For instance, cross-country di¤erences in the level parameter of
the altruistic function,  , in equation (28) do not deliver an exact match of the fertility data. Similarly, introducing
a level parameter in the human capital production function in (4) to capture overall e¢ ciency is not enough to match
the residual schooling data. This is the case because this level e¤ect would be subsumed by TFP.
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as every extra year of schooling would raise human capital by more than in countries with higher i.
Recall that countries with lower i exhibit a higher degree of complementarity and self-productivity
in human capital production in the sense of Cunha et al. (2006). Therefore, countries for which
the benchmark model predicts lower schooling than in the data in Figure 5, such as Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Bolivia, Burundi, and Togo, among others, would require i < 1 so
that by raising the degree of complementarity in human capital production, the model is able to
correctly predict schooling as in the data. In contrast, countries like Switzerland, Thailand, Panama
and Peru require i > 1.
The full model with country-specic is and is has reasonable implications in a number of
dimensions and provides interesting insights. For instance, Figure 6 plots the returns to schooling
implied by the full model, which vary between about 13% and 6% and are decreasing in SLE,
all reasonable features. Figure 7 plots the measure of human capital h(s; E) in the full model
relative to the benchmark model (in log 10 scale). The gure underscores the relatively higher
degree of complementarity in educational investments among some of the rich countries. The
largest upward adjustments in the human capital measures are observed in Australia, New Zealand,
Belgium, Ireland, Iceland, Great Britain, Netherlands, and all the Scandinavian countries, which
are particularly known for their high-quality educational systems. For the rest of the countries in
the sample, the full model suggests important di¤erences in human capital production functions,
even among countries with similar per capita income. In other words, even among countries with
similar educational inputs, di¤erences in their complementarity in the production of skills result in
di¤erent schooling and human capital levels.
More interestingly, the introduction of di¤erences in human capital production functions across
countries in the full model results in a re-evaluation of cross-country TFP di¤erences.20 Figure
8 displays TFP in the full model relative to the benchmark (in log 10 scale). TFP is adjusted
downwards precisely in those countries in which human capital was adjusted upwards in Figure
7, and the other way around. This is the case because in the absence of country-specic is
(benchmark model) any di¤erences in human capital production technologies are attributed to
di¤erences in TFP. We nd that while in the benchmark model the correlation between TFP and
GDP per capita is 85%, it is 25% in the full model. Most the drop of this correlation is explained
by the fact that human capital in richer countries is substantially higher in the full model than in
the benchmark.
Table 5 reports some moments implied by the full model. Except for the time cost of raising
children, all other moments are targeted in the calibration (see Table 3). Overall the full model
matches these moments quite well.
4 RESULTS
In this section we use our model to evaluate the role of di¤erent exogenous variables in explaining
the world dispersion of schooling, fertility and per capita income. As we show, these counterfac-
20Notice that the presence of country-specic is and is requires re-calculating wages in (29) for each country.
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tual exercises uncover the main models mechanisms, in particular a non-monotonic relationship
between schooling and TFP. The exercises also highlight the role of heterogeneity in human capital
production functions across countries.
4.1 Counterfactuals
Table 6 reports the results of counterfactual exercises that equate one parameter at a time across
countries. We create an articial "rich country" whose TFP, educational policies and the fraction of
school non-repeaters (s, ep and d) correspond to the 90th percentile of the sample, and whose mor-
tality rates and education prices (p1, p2, p3 and pE) are at the 10th percentile. The counterfactuals
equate each parameter to its value in this articial rich country. We also conduct counterfactuals
for parameter groups: all mortality rates (p1, p2, and p3) and the two education policies (s and
ep).21 As we now discuss, there are four main insights from Table 6. First, the number of years of
public education provision (s) is the most important determinant of schooling dispersion, followed
by working-age mortality rates (p2). Second, TFP (wages) is the most important determinant of
the international dispersion of fertility, followed by public education spending per pupil (ep) and
retiree mortality rates (p3). Third, when taken as a group, mortality rates (p1, p2, and p3) are
the second most important determinant of schooling dispersion. Last, the second most important
determinant of fertility dispersion is almost a tie between mortality rates as a group (p1, p2, and
p3), and education policies (s and ep).
4.1.1 TFP
Under the counterfactual that equates TFP in every country to the 90th percentile value, mean
schooling increases while mean fertility decreases. In fact, as seen in Table 6, these changes in the
means of schooling and fertility are the largest of any counterfactual: mean schooling increases
by 19.9% and fertility decreases by 36.8%. In addition, the reduction of the standard deviation of
fertility is the largest among all counterfactuals, in the order of 55.7%, while the standard deviation
of schooling slightly increases by 1.7%.
To better understand these results, Figure 9 plots the predicted fertility and schooling in the
model under the TFP counterfactual. Recall that the full model is calibrated to exactly match
fertility and schooling for each country, so all the observations in Figure 9 can be interpreted as
deviations from the plotted 45-degree line (calibrated model). Fertility drops in all countries, with
particularly large falls in countries like Burundi, Malawi, Uganda, Bolivia, Kenya and Ghana. These
countries exhibit particularly low TFP (and wages) in the calibrated full model, so raising TFP
signicantly increases the time cost of raising children, resulting in lower fertility. Interestingly,
these are also the countries for which schooling increases the most under the counterfactual, a strong
quantity-quality trade-o¤. Notice also from Figure 7 that these are among the poor countries for
21 It is common in the literature to equate values to US levels, but the US is somewhat of an outlier among the rich
on both mortality and education variables. Creating the articial rich country for the counterfactuals avoids values
in outlier countries to inuence the results.
27
which human capital is adjusted upwards in the full model, and from Figure 8 that their TFP is
adjusted down. In other words, among the poor, these are countries that exhibit relatively lower
TFP and higher complementarity in the production of human capital. The message of this exercise
is very clear and suggests an important qualication of the common view that development in the
form of higher wages is the most important tool to reduce fertility. What we nd is that a high
degree of complementarity of educational investments is key to reinforce the e¤ect of higher wages
on the reduction of fertility among poor countries.
Notice that the standard deviation of schooling increases slightly under the TFP counterfactual
(1.7%). Although puzzling, this occurs precisely because of the heterogeneous e¤ect among poor
countries. While schooling increases substantially in countries with higher complementary in human
capital production, it increases relatively less in those countries in which educational investments
have a lower impact in skill formation. This result suggests the importance of understanding
di¤erences in the human capital production functions among poorer countries.
The muted e¤ect of cross-country TFP di¤erences in explaining the dispersion of schooling
should be interpreted carefully. As we now turn to explain, our model features a number of
compounded and non-linear e¤ects which alter aggregate measures such as the standard deviation,
but hide interesting insights regarding the models mechanisms.
4.1.2 Non-monotonic schooling and models mechanisms
Before turning to the counterfactuals regarding public education policies, and to better understand
the role of TFP in our model, we now report two exercises to uncover some of the models mech-
anisms. Figure 10 plots the relationship between fertility and TFP (left panel) and schooling and
TFP (right panel). The gure is constructed by using the models calibration of the US economy
and varying TFP across wide range of values. Notably, mortality rates, public education policies,
i and i are at their US values in the calibrated full model. The left panel shows that fertility is
monotonically decreasing in TFP, with fertility dropping sharply at low TFP levels, and attening
out at higher TFP levels. The main mechanism at work is the time cost of raising children, which
increases with wages.
In contrast with the monotonic behavior of fertility, schooling is non-monotonic in TFP. At very
low levels of TFP schooling is highest, then it drops sharply and it nally increases monotonically
with TFP. The reason for this monotonic behavior can be traced to the public education policies
in the US, which are kept at their 2013 levels. In the US, public education spending per pupil is
ep = $15; 040 and years of public provision are s = 12:94. At very low levels of TFP, it is optimal to
send children to school to receive the comparatively high education subsidy. Not attending school
and giving up the education subsidy is too costly relative to working at very low wages. Financial
constraints are also at work here: at very low TFP levels, there would not be much of consumption
jump between the schooling and working years, lowering the cost of staying at a highly subsidized
school longer. Notice that optimal schooling at very low TFP levels is 22 years, which means
students attend school beyond the years of the public subsidy coverage. Parents nd it optimal to
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nance private education spending beyond s.
As TFP levels start increasing, the trade-o¤ between staying at school with high education
subsides and cutting school shorter to start working changes in favor of the latter. As can be
seen in Figure 10, schooling sharply drops to levels below 16 years. Notice that even at this level,
students are still enjoying the benet of the high levels of public spending for the full length of
the subsidy (12.94 years). The main change is that parents are now nancing fewer years of fully
private education spending. Finally, the last portion of the schooling graph is more standard, with
schooling increasing in TFP.
The main message of Figure 10 is that non-monotonicities require caution in interpreting coun-
terfactuals that involve equalization of TFP levels across countries. In particular, in the presence of
nancial constraints, schooling choice interacts with both education spending and TFP in intricate
ways. To further understand this point in the context of cross-country analysis, we perform an
additional counterfactual exercise displayed in Figure 11.
The exercise in Figure 11 contrasts with that of Figure 9 in that rather than equating TFP
across countries, the counterfactual in Figure 11 equates all country-specic parameters to that of
the articial "rich country", expect for TFP. In other words, all countries have s, ep and d equal
to the 90th percentile of the sample; p1, p2, p3 and pE equal to the 10th percentile; and their
own TFP level. Although this counterfactual is not as informative for policy analysis, it eliminates
some of the compounding e¤ects present in Figure 9. What Figure 11 implies that if countries
only di¤ered in TFP levels, one could still explain about 66% of the schooling dispersion observed
in the data. What is remarkable is the heterogeneity among countries whose years of schooling
in the data is below the 13.86 sample average. In a rst group of countries, including Burundi,
Mozambique, Togo, Malawi and Uganda, schooling choice is the highest. This is the case because
even though TFP is very low there, if government education subsidies were as high as $17,179 in all
these countries, students would optimally choose to stay at school longer. This intuition parallels
the mechanism explaining the behavior of schooling at very low TFP levels in Figure 10.
As seen on the right panel of Figure 11, there is a second group of countries, including Niger,
Mali and Pakistan, where schooling increases under the counterfactual, but not nearly as much
as in the rst group. TFP in this second group of countries is relatively higher than in the rst.
Students in these countries stay at school fewer years because even though they enjoy a high
education subsidy under the counterfactual, wages are not as low as in the rst group of countries.
These countries can be rationalized by the decreasing portion of the schooling function on the right
panel of Figure 10.
In addition to clarifying the relationship between schooling and TFP in the model, Figures 10
and 11 also shed light on the relationship between public education variables in the model (s and
ep) in the model, as we now turn to explain.
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4.1.3 Public schooling policies
One of the contributions of this paper is to use a microfounded model to evaluate the notion that
education is the best tool to lower fertility rates in the developing world. Our model allows us
to separately analyze the role of di¤erences in the amount of public education subsidies per pupil
(intensive margin) as well as the number of years of public school provision (extensive margin).
First, as seen in Table 6, equating the amount of the public education subsidy per pupil ep to the
90th percentile value results in an increase of the schooling mean, and a decrease of the fertility mean
as well as the standard deviations of schooling and fertility. The largest e¤ect of this counterfactual
is the reduction of the standard deviation of fertility by 22.6%. Recall from Table 1 that the mean
ep in the sample is $6,601, while the median is $3,952. The 90th percentile value in the sample
is $17,179. Everything else equal, an increase in ep means that students can accumulate more
human capital for each year they stay at school. For most countries this results in increased years
of schooling and lower fertility rates, as shown in Figure 12.
Most of the action of this counterfactual comes from poorer countries, which exhibit the largest
drops in fertility and increases in schooling. In fact, in some poorer countries schooling increases so
much as to hit the constraint s < F . Notice that some of these are among the poorer countries with
relatively higher degree of complementarity in educational investments (Burundi, Togo, Malawi,
and Uganda). Again, this can be seen in Figure 7 from the set of poor countries for which the full
model adjusts human capital upwards. The main message from this counterfactual is that even if
governments provide educational subsidies for only a few years, investing more resources per pupil
is the key to drop fertility levels and increase schooling years. This is particularly true for poorer
countries in which educational investments exhibit higher complementarity in the production of
skills. Notice that under the counterfactual the governments budget is balanced, so these higher
educational resources are nanced through lump-sum taxation.
Turning now to the extensive margin of public education provision, equating the number of
years of public education provision (s) to the 90th percentile level has similar qualitative e¤ects
as equating the amount of the subsidy (ep), but very di¤erent quantitative e¤ects. The average s
in the sample is 9.6 years, the maximum value is 16.5 years (Ireland), and the 90th percentile of
s is 13.8 years. The largest quantitative e¤ect of this counterfactual is the drop of the standard
deviation of schooling by 38.9%. In fact, this the counterfactual that generates the largest drop
in schooling dispersion. Most of the action in this counterfactual comes from schooling in poorer
countries. In fact, as seen in Figure 13, schooling remains virtually unchanged in high-schooling
countries, while for almost all low-schooling countries schooling is at least equal to the new s of
13.8 years. In the latter countries students take full advantage of the larger s and stay at school
for at least that long, resulting in a large decrease of the standard deviation of schooling.
Perhaps the most interesting insight of the s counterfactual is that fertility drops little in poor
countries (Table 6). Recall that in these countries governments tend to o¤er modest education sub-
sidies per pupil (ep). The counterfactual suggests that keeping public schools open for more grades
while spending little per pupil may not decrease fertility levels. Parents under this counterfactual
send their children to school as long as the government o¤ers the subsidy, but not beyond that point.
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They take advantage of the small education subsidy and nance their childrens consumption for
more schooling years, but this does not provide enough incentives for them to reduce the number
of children. This counterfactual echoes the concern in policy circles that extending the provision of
public education may not result in decreased fertility levels in developing countries. But as we now
turn to explain, the e¤ective tool to decrease fertility levels is to improve the provision of public
education in both the extensive and intensive margins. The extensive margin alone is not enough.
In fact, when both ep and s are equalized to their respective 90th percentile values across
countries, there is a large drop of 39.6% of the standard deviation of fertility (Table 6). In addition,
a nontrivial increase in mean schooling is observed (13.8%), together with a drop in mean fertility
(17.7%). Fertility rates fall below 4 children in all poorer countries. As indicated above, it is the
simultaneous increase in the duration and the magnitude of the public education subsidy what
is key to reducing the mean and standard deviation of fertility across countries. The increase in
human capital achieved through public schools that o¤er not only more grade levels, but that also
invest more per pupil, are large enough to induce drops in fertility rates. The channels at work
here are the larger time costs of raising children for those with high human capital, together with
the larger goods costs generated by the additional private education spending per child.
All in all, this counterfactual underscores the importance of public education provision in ex-
plaining the cross-country dispersion of fertility and schooling, an insight that has been widely
discussed in policy circles, but not evaluated in a carefully calibrated micro-founded model. The
main message is that improving the quality of schools in poorer countries, as measured by spending
per pupil, is key to decrease fertility levels.
Last, Table 6 also reports the counterfactuals for school non-repeating rates (d) and the relative
price of education (pE). We nd that these do not have a quantitative signicant e¤ect on the
dispersion of either schooling or fertility.
4.1.4 Mortality rates
As can be seen in Table 6, equating each of the mortality rates to the 10th percentile value has
the same qualitative e¤ect: mean schooling increases, while mean fertility and the standard devi-
ations of fertility and schooling decrease. Higher survival rates imply a higher working-life span,
increasing the incentives to remain in school longer. In the steady-state equilibrium longer school-
ing years requires a longer period for parents to nance consumption and education spending for
their children. The quantity-quality channel is again present here, resulting in lower fertility rates.
Notice from Table 6 that the decrease in students/ workersmortality (p2) has the largest e¤ect
on the standard deviation of schooling, while it is the decrease in retirees mortality (p3) that has
the largest e¤ect on the dispersion of fertility. The rst result is intuitive the higher the probability
of surviving the working years, the higher the incentives to remain in school longer, which will have
a larger impact among the poor countries. The second result is more intriguing, but it captures
interesting mechanisms in the model. The direct e¤ect of a decrease in p3 is to increase the length
of life, increasing both welfare and the marginal benet of having children. However, the marginal
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cost of children also increases due to the presence of the binding transfer constrained captured by
G > 1. Holding s, n and e(a) constant, an decrease in p3 implies lower consumption for workers
and retirees because the same lifetime income needs to be spread over a longer lifetime. Lower cW
implies lower G and therefore a higher marginal benet of going to school and spending more in
education. As a result, h(s) increases and the time cost of raising children increases. This higher
marginal cost of raising children dominates, inducing fertility to fall and schooling, expenditures in
education, and h(s) to further increase. This is a novel channel, mostly absent in the literature on
fertility. Demographers have traditionally emphasized the role of child mortality (p1) on fertility
choice, while our channel refers to retiree mortality (p3). The novel insight of our model in this
respect is that higher survival at elder ages induces both higher schooling and early investments in
human capital, as well as lower fertility. This channel is absent in models without credit frictions,
but it arises naturally in models in which children nancially depend on their parents and parents
cannot leave debt obligations to them.
Another notable result from Table 6 is that childrens mortality has a relatively small e¤ect
on the dispersion of schooling and fertility. This is not surprising to the extent that in 2013 the
cross-country dispersion of childrens mortality was relatively smaller (Table 1).
Figure 14 portrays the case in which all mortality rates, for children, workers and retirees,
are equated to their respective 90th percentile values. As seen in the gure, fertility decreases
across the board, with the drop being higher in poorer than in richer countries, resulting in a
fall of the standard deviation of 38.5%, a quantitatively strong e¤ect (Table 6). The standard
deviation of schooling also falls signicantly, by 25.4%. Figure 14 shows that while schooling is
mostly unchanged for rich countries, it increases for all poorer countries. Altogether, the mortality
counterfactuals largely support the view held by demographers on the importance of mortality in
explaining di¤erences in schooling and fertility across countries, although with the qualication
that adult mortality has become quantitatively more important in recent years.
4.2 Development accounting
The discussion of counterfactual exercises has so far been centered on the international quantity-
quality trade-o¤. But as reported in Table 6, our model has also implications for development
accounting, providing insights about the sources of cross-country per capita income di¤erences.
The main message from Table 6 is that the largest drops in the standard deviation of per capita
income are attributed to the public education variables. Equating ep across countries to the 90th
percentile value results in a drop of 26.6% in the standard deviation of per capita income. If both
ep and s are equalized, then the drop is 44%.
Compared to public education policies, mortality plays a quantitatively lesser role. Equating
all p1, p2, and p3 across countries results in a drop of the standard deviation of per capita income
of 9.2%. But what is perhaps more surprising is that equating TFP to its 90th percentile increases
this standard deviation by 11.4%. Although surprising relative to the development accounting
literature, this result echoes the one found for the dispersion of schooling (Figure 9) and highlights
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the importance of non-monotonicities in our model, as well as the role of cross-country di¤erences
in human capital technologies. What this result says is that while TFP di¤erences are important to
explain why many countries are poor or rich in our sample, there are also many countries for which
di¤erences in human capital technologies are more important. As explained above, raising TFP will
lead to higher gains in years of schooling in those countries with higher degree of complementarity
in human capital production. For these countries, the human capital technology amplies the TFP
e¤ect. But there are other similarly poor countries for which this amplication does not occur due
to the lower complementarity in the production of human capital.
The main lesson from the development accounting exercises is not that TFP is unimportant,
but that the e¢ ciency in the production of human capital among similarly poor countries mediates
the ultimate e¤ects of a TFP increase on cross-country income di¤erences. Even though we have so
far emphasized di¤erences in human capital production functions among poor countries, our paper
also documents important di¤erences among the rich. For example, our full model implies a higher
degree of complementarity in human capital production in Scandinavian countries, and a lower one
in countries such as Spain and Italy. These di¤erences also result in varying responses to increases
in TFP. In this respect, a message from our development accounting exercise is the caution that
should be taken in interpreting global TFP counterfactuals, and the need to better understand the
di¤erences in the e¢ ciency of output production and human capital production across countries.
4.3 Robustness analysis
In this section we report some robustness checks for our results. We concentrate on two relevant
features of our full model. One is the role of the country-specic is and is, and the other is the
disentangling of  from  in the utility function.
4.3.1 Counterfactuals under the benchmark model
Table 7 repeats the full set of counterfactuals in Table 6, but rather than using our full model, it
uses the benchmark. Recall that under the benchmark model human capital production parameter
 and altruistic parameter  are the same across countries. Recall also that it is the full model the
one that provides a more accurate decomposition of the mechanisms at work, since the benchmark
does not perfectly t the schooling and fertility data.
Except for the TFP counterfactual, Tables 6 and 7 are by in large very similar. In fact, the main
di¤erence is on the e¤ect of TFP on the dispersion of schooling and per capita income, as the e¤ect
on fertility is also similar in both tables. Two conclusions can be drawn from this comparison.
First, introducing di¤erences across countries in altruism () does not have major quantitative
e¤ects on the models predictions. Second, di¤erences in human capital production parameter 
do alter the qualitative properties of the model because they induce a re-evaluation of both human
capital stocks and TFP levels, both of which are unobservable variables. As shown in Figure 6, the
returns to schooling in the full model are quite reasonable, and as shown in Figures 7 and 8, the
full model does change our measurement of human capital and TFP.
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The comparison of Tables 6 and 7 suggest the need to more systematically explore the di¤erences
in human capital productions across countries, a task we leave for future research. We introduced
enough exogenous variation across countries in the form of mortality rates and public education
policies, but these together with the implied TFP di¤erences were not enough to fully explain the
observed schooling dispersion. While our is rationalize the residual di¤erences, a pressing issue
is to further investigate the origin of these di¤erences. As the task of the development accounting
literature has been in part to unbundle the large cross-country TFP di¤erences, what we learn
from our analysis is that di¤erences in human capital production functions induce not only a re-
evaluation of TFP levels, but also interesting trade-o¤s on the schooling and fertility choices of
individuals.
4.3.2 Other robustness
As explained above, our model provides novel insights into the role of retiree mortality (p3), partic-
ularly in explaining fertility di¤erences. One may wonder the extent to which our utility function
specication drives this result, and any other results regarding the role of mortality variables. Re-
call that our utility function disentangles the mortality aversion coe¢ cient, , from the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution 1=. This contrasts with the standard expected utility version that
assumes  = .
We tested the e¤ect of disentangling  from  by exogenously increasing  to make it closer to
 = 1. Of course this requires omitting the VSL as one of the calibration targets. We nd that
as  ! 1 the e¤ect of retiree mortality under the counterfactual exercises becomes even stronger.
In fact, as  ! 1 the VSL in the model explodes to innity. For instance, raising  from the
calibrated benchmark of 0:55 to  = 0:75 implies a VSL of $7 million in the US, a value at the
high end of available estimates. This higher VSL in the presence of nancial frictions amplies the
e¤ect of living longer on fertility choices. We conclude that our results regarding the importance of
adult mortality are not exaggerated. Quite the opposite, they are quantitatively important without
implying an unreasonably high VSL.
5 CONCLUDING COMMENTS
International data reveals a persistent and signicant dispersion of schooling and fertility rates
across countries and an overall quantity-quality trade-o¤: one more child per women is associated
with around three fewer years of schooling. We investigate the underlying determinants of this
trade-o¤. Our model incorporates some of the key mechanisms behind schooling and fertility
decisions stressed by the existing literature into a single unied theory. We incorporate enough
heterogeneity into the model as to exactly match the data using a carefully calibrated version of
the model. The result is a more complete and compelling decomposition of the underlying forces
behind schooling, fertility and income di¤erences.
Four takeaways from the analysis can be highlighted. First, the notion that development and
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the associated higher wages are the best recipe to lower fertility levels is plausible, but it requires
the qualication that this channel works best in countries in which educational investments are
more complementary in producing human capital. In other words, the quantity-quality trade-o¤
is stronger in countries that are better able to use educational resources to generate higher human
capital.
The second takeaway is that extending the length of public education, as has been seen with
the increase is compulsory schooling years, without increasing the educational resources per pupil
may not generate signicant drops in fertility rates in poor countries. These increases in length do
result in higher schooling years, but at low levels of spending per pupil, the human capital gains
are so minimal, that there are no signicant incentives for fertility rates to drop. This takes us to
the third takeaway of the analysis: even if for a limited number of years, raising public educational
resources per pupil in poorer countries could unleash a virtuous cycle, particularly for countries
with higher complementarity in the human capital production function. In these countries, higher
public education subsidies result not only in lower fertility, but also in higher complementary private
educational investments, and higher schooling attainment.
The fourth takeaway is that while demographers have emphasized the role of child mortality
in fertility choice, we nd that increases in retiree survival rates are more important. For one, by
2013 the cross-country dispersion of child mortality is lower than that of elderly mortality. What
we learn from the model is that living longer requires spreading consumption over more years,
which raises the incentives of increasing schooling and human capital, raises the time cost of having
children, and lowers fertility rates.
Our insights speak to a literature that underscores the importance of improving educational
quality in developing countries (Schoellman, 2012). While as summarized in Lee and Barro (2001)
there is debate on how to achieve this, rethinking the characteristics of how human capital is
produced at schools in the developing world is of rst-order importance in understanding the
international quantity-quality trade-o¤.
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APPENDIX FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
1 Model solution
1.1 Individuals problem
The problem of the representative agent is described recursively as:
V (b1; b2) = max
[c(a)]1t=0;[es(a)]
s
t=0;b
0
1;b
0
2;s;n
1
1  C
1  +  (n)V
 
b01; b
0
2

(1)
where
C =


Z 1
0
e a (a)
1 
1  c (a)1  da
 1
1 
+ C; and (2)
(n) = e F (F )
1 
1   
 
1  e n :
The maximization is subject to the following constraints:
b1 
Z s
0
(c (a) + es (a)) q (a) da; (3)
q(s)b2 +W (s; n;E)  
Z R
s
q (a) da+
Z 1
s
c (a) q (a) da+ q (F )nb01 + q
 
F + s0

nb02; (4)
Z s
0
(d (ep (a) + es (a)) =pE)
 da
=
 h (s;E) ;
l (n; a) =
(
1 if a  F
l (n) if a > F
; and
b02  0 and es(a)  0 for a 2 [0; s] :
where
W (s; n;E) = wh (s;E)
Z R
s
e(a s)l(n; a)q(a)da: (5)
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Prices and survival probabilities satisfy:
q(a) = e ra (a) and (6)
 (a) =
8><>:
e p1a for a  ac
 (ac) e
 p2(a ac) for ac < a  as
 (as) e
 p3(a as) for a > as
: (7)
The associated Lagrangian can be written as:
V (b1; b2) =
1
1 C
1  + (n)V (b01; b02)
+1

b1  
R s
0 (c (a) + es (a)) q (a) da

+2
h
q(s)b2 +W (s; n;E) 
R1
s c (a) q (a) da  q (F )nb01   q (F + s0)nb02   
R R
s q (a) da
i
+3
R s
0 (d (ep (a) + es (a)) =pE)
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=   h (s;E)+ 4es(s) + 5b02:
The choice variables are [c (a)]1t=0 ; b
0
1; b
0
2; [es (a)]
s
t=0 ; s; h (s;E) ; and n 2 [0; n]. Use (*) to denote
optimal solutions. Let E be the present value of private expenditures in education dened as:
E 
Z s
0
es(a)q(a)da: (8)
1.2 Optimal consumption
First order conditions with respect to c (a) can be written as
1q (a) = C
  (C   C) e a (a) 1 1  c (a)  for a  s; and (9)
2q (a) = C
  (C   C) e a (a) 1 1  c (a)  for s  a: (10)
Using (6), these equations become:
c (a) = C 

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1

1 e
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1
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 
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 
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Let cS (s) and cW (s) denote consumption at time s as a student and as a worker respectively.
Dividing (9) by (10) it follows that:
cW (s)
cS (s)
=

1
2
 1

:
2
Dene
G  1
2
: (12)
Then
cW (s) = cS (s)G
1
 : (13)
Use (11), (12), and (13) to obtain:
c (a) = e
r 

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1

 
1  c (0) for a  s and (14)
c (a) = e
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To solve for c (0) ; substitute (14) into (3) to obtain:
c (0) =
b1   ER s
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 #a (a)

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1 
1  da
where #  r   r   

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Substituting this result into (14) and (15):
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1 and 2 can be solved in terms of c (0) ; using (9) and (12), as
1 = c
 (0)  C  (C   C)  and (19)
2 = c
 (0)  C  (C   C) =G: (20)
1.3 Optimal transfers
First order conditions with respect to b01 and b02 are given by
2q(F )n
 = (n)V1
 
b01 ; b
0
2

;
2q(F + s
)n = (n)V2
 
b01 ; b
0
2

+ 5;
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while the corresponding envelope conditions are
V1 (b1; b2) = 1 and V2 (b1; b2) = 2q(s):
Then the optimality conditions for b01 and b02 can then be expressed as:
parent2 q(F )n
 = (n)child1 ; and
parent2 q(F + s
)n > (n)child2 q(s
);
where the latter has been written assuming b02 = 0, which we later verify. At steady state they
become, using (6), (7), (12) and (13),

cW (s)
cS (s)

= G = G(n)  e rF (F ) n

(n)
(21)
and
e rF (F )
n
(n)
= G (n) >
 (F ) (s)
 (F + s)
= e (p1 p2)ac :
If p1  p2; i.e., child mortality is larger than adult mortality, as is the case in the data, then a
su¢ cient condition for the transfer constraint to bind is G(n) > 1: In what follows we assume that
parameters are such that the transfer constraint binds so that b02 = 0: We conrm that in all our
calibrations, G(n) > 1 for all countries in our sample.
To solve for b1 = b01 , substitute (15), (6) and b2 = 0 into (4) to obtain:
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Z R
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1

Z 1
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Using (16) to substitute for c (0) and solving for b1 it transpires that:
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1.4 Optimal human capital, schooling and school expenditures
1.4.1 Human capital
First order condition with respect to h(s; E) gives
3
2
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h (s;E)
=
Z R
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)q(a)l(n; a)da
Dividing 12 = G(n
) by 32 to obtain:
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where h  h(s; E):
1.4.2 School expenditures
Now, the rst order condition with respect to es(a) is
3
@h(s;E)
@es(a)
+ 4 = 1q (a) :
When the solution is interior, 4 = 0; this expression reduces to, using (23):
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h
 
 e^ (a)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where e^ (a) is the solution for e (a) = es(a) + ep(a) if es(a) > 0: This interior solution can be
written as:
e^ (a) = e^ (0) q(a) 
1
1  : (25)
with
e^ (0) =

dh
 
 p E W
=G(n)
 1
1 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Let e (a) denotes the optimal solution for e(a) = es(a) + ep(a). Since ep(0) = 0 then initial
expenditures satisfy:
e (0) = e^ (0) : (27)
5
The full solution for e (a), allowing for corners, satisfy
e (a) =
(
e (0) q(a) 
1
1  if es (a) > 0
ep if a  s and es (a) = 0
(28)
Figure 1a illustrates three possible solutions for e (a) : Case 1 illustrates a situation in which there
is only private spending in education during pre-school since optimal schooling, s1, is lower than
s. Case 2 illustrates a case in which private spending includes pre-school and some college, since
optimal schooling s2 is larger than s; but no prive spending in the interval [s; s], say during primary
and secondary: Finally in Case 3, optimal schooling is s3 > s but now there is also some private
spending in the interval [s; s]. In the calibration, we set s to be 6.
To describe more precisely the solution for e (a) ; let bs be implicitly dened by the equationbe (bs) = ep: Intuitively, bs is the age at which the individual stops relying fully in public education
and start using some private funds. Using (25), (6) and (7), it follows that:
bs = ( 1p2+r h(1  ) ln epe^(0)  p1ac + p2aci if ep  e^(0)
0 if ep  e^(0)
(29)
Now, it could happen that bs < 6 or bs > s; cases in which bs does not really represents the time at
which full public education ends. An precise age for this to happen is dened by:
sp  min fs; s;max [s; bs]g : (30)
We now can characterize e (a) more precisely as follows:
e (a) =
8>><>>:
be (0) q (a)  11  for a  min(s; s)
ep for min(s; s)  a  spbe (0) q (a)  11  for sp  a  s
(31)
where e^ (0) is given by (26). Private educational expense can then be obtained as:
es (a) =
8>>>><>>>>:
e (a) for a  min (s; s)
0 for min (s; s)  a  sp
e (a)  ep for sp  a  min (s; s)
e (a) for min (s; s)  a  s
(32)
Plugging these results into (8) one obtains:
E = e^ (0) 
2
 
s; sp
  ep Z min(s;s)
sp
q(a)da (33)
6
where

2
 
s; sp

=
"Z min(s;6)
0
q(a)
  
1  da+
Z s
sp
q(a)
  
1  da
#
:
1.4.3 Human capital
Human capital at age s, h = h (s;E) ; can be written as
h =
 Z s
0

d
e(a)
pE

da+
Z s
sp

d
e(a)
pE

da+
Z sp
s

d
ep
pE

da
! 

=

de (0)
pE
 

3(s
;
ep
e(0)
)
=
(34)
where

3(s
;
ep
e(0)
) 
Z s
0
q(a)
  
1  da+
Z s
sp
q(a)
  
1  da+

ep
e(0)

(sp   s) :
Notice that:
hs(s
;E) =


h
1 


de(s)
pE

: (35)
Plug (34) into (26),
e (0) =

dp E W
=G(n)
 1
1 
h
 

1
1 
=

dp E W
=G(n)
 1
1 

de (0)
pE
  
1 


3

s;
ep
e(0)
  1
1 
:
Solving for e(0),
e (0) = W = (G(n)
3 (s; ep=e(0))) : (36)
1.4.4 Schooling
The rst order condition for s is given by
C 
1
1   (C   C)
 e s

 (s)
1 
1 
h
cS (s)1    cW (s)1 
i
(37)
= 1
 
cS (s) + es (s
)

q (s)  2

Ws (s
; n; E) + cW (s) q (s) + q (s)

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where, according to (5),
Ws (s
; n;E) = wh (s;E)

 q(s)l (n; s) +

hs (s
;E)
h (s;E)
  
Z R
s
e(a s
)q(a)l(n; a)da

= W 
"
hs (s
;E)
h (s;E)
     q(s
)l (n; s)R R
s e
(a s)q(a)l(n; a)da
#
: (38)
According to (35) and (34):
hs (s
;E)
h (s;E)
=


h (s;E) 



de(s)
pE

=


"
de (0)
pE
 

3

s;
ep
e(0)
=#  de(s)
pE

=


1

3

s; epe(0)
 e(s)
e (0)

: (39)
In the case that e(s) is interior, then e
(s)
e(0) = q (s
) 
1
1  according to (31).
Plugging (9) and (10) into (37), and combining terms results in:
1
1  
h
cS (s)1    cW (s)1 
i
= cS (s) 
 
cS (s) + es (s
)

 cW (s) 

1
q (s)
Ws (s
; n;E) + cW (s) + 

or
es (s
) + cS (s)
G(n)1= 1   1
1=   1 =
1
G(n)
1
q (s)
Ws (s
; n;E) +

G(n)
: (40)
When  ! 1; this expression becomes
es (s
) + cS (s) lnG(n) =
1
G(n)
1
q (s)
Ws (s
; n;E) +

G(n)
:
Lemma 1. Consider a pure private educational system. In particular, suppose ep = 0 and  = 0:
Then, (40) is an equation in two unknowns: s and n: In particular, (40) is indepedent of w.
Proof. In that case, the rst order condition with respect to schooling, Equation (40), simplies
to:
es (s)
W 
+
cS (s)
W 
G(n)1= 1   1
1=   1 =
1
G(n)
1
q (s)
Ws(s
; n;E)
W 
: (41)
We next show that all ratios in this equation depend only on s and n, none of them depend
8
on w. Setting ep = 0; the following equations follow from (31), (32), (33) and (36):
es (s)
W 
=

q (s)
1
1  G(n)
3 (s; 0)
and (42)
E
W 
=

2 (s
; 6)
G(n)
3 (s; 0)
: (43)
Similarly, setting  = 0; the following equations follow from (22) and (17):
b1
W 
=
1

1(s)G(n)
1
 + q (F )n

1 +G(n)
1

1(s
)
E
W 

; (44)
cS (s)
W 
=
e
r 

s (s)
1

 
1 R s
0 e
 #a (a)


1 
1  da

b1
W 
  E

W 

: (45)
According to (42), e

s(s
)
W  only depends on s
 and n. Same result is obtained for c
S(s)
W  by
substituing (43) and (44) into (45). In other words, the left hand side of (41) only depends
on s and n. As for the right hand side of (41), according to (38) and (39),
Ws(s
; n;E)
W 
=


q (s) 

1 

3 (s; 0)
     q(s
)l (n; s)R R
s e
(a s)q(a)l(n; a)da

which depends only on s and n.
1.5 Fertility
First order condition with respect to fertility is:
q(F )b01 + q (F + s
) b02  Wn(s; n;E) =
@ (n)
@n
V (b01 ; b02 )
2
(46)
where
Wn(s
; n;E) = wh (s;E)
Z R
s
e(a s
)ln (n
; a) q(a)da
= W (s; n;E)
R R
s e
(a s)ln (n; a) q(a)daR R
s e
(a s)l (n; a) q(a)da
(47)
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The value function at steady state can be solved, from (1), as
V  =
1
1 C
1 
1   (n) ; (48)
while the term C can be solved, using (2), (14) and (15), as
C =


Z 1
0
e a (a)
1 
1  c (a)1  da
 1
1 
+ C (49)
= c (0) 
4 (s; n) + C:
where

4 (s
; n) = 
1
1 
"Z s
0
e #a (a)


1 
1  da+G(n)
1 

Z 1
s
e #a (a)


1 
1  da
# 1
1 
:
Using b1 = b
0
1 ; b
0
2 = 0; (48) and (49), (46) can be written as:
q(F )b1  Wn(s; n;E) =
n(n
)
1   (n)
1
1  
C1 
c (0)  C  (C   C) =G (n) (50)
=
n(n
)
1   (n)
G (n) =
1  
C
((C   C) =c (0))
=
n(n
)
1   (n)
G (n) =
1  
c (0) 
4 (s; n) + C
(
4 (s; n))
Lemma 2. Consider a pure private educational system. In particular, suppose ep = 0 and  = 0:
Furthermore suppose C = 0: Then (50) is an equation in two unknowns: s and n: In
particular, (50) is independent of w.
Proof. Equation (50) can be written as
q(F )
b1
W 
  Wn(s
; n;E)
W 
(51)
=
n(n
)
1   (n)
G (n) =
1  

4 (s
; n) c (0) =W  + C=W 
(
4 (s; n))
:
According to (44) and (47), the left hand side of (51) only depends on s and n. According
to (43), (44) and (17), c
(0)
W  only depends on s
 and n. Therefore, the right hand side of (51)
only depends on s and n if C = 0:
Proposition 1. Optimal fertility and schooling are independent of wages if: (i) the utility function
in (49) is homothetic, e.g. C = 0; and (ii) there is no public education: ep =  = 0 for all a.
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Proof. Follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Under the stated conditions, Equations (41) and
(50) are two equation in two unknowns: s and n. Wages are not part of the two equations.
Notice that, according to (51), the marginal benet of a child increases with CW  . This means
that a positive C increases the marginal benet of children proportional more in poor countries
where W is smaller.
1.6 Governments budget constraint
The revenue of government from every individuals taxes is 
Z R
s
~n (a) da, where
~n(a) =
e gna(a)R1
0 e
 gna(a)da
:
and the per capita government expenditure is ep
Z min(s;s)
s
e gna(a)da. The governments budget
constraint requires the lump-sum taxes  annually imposed on households satises
 =
Z min(s;s)
s
ep~n (a) daZ R
s
~n (a) da
=
ep
Z min(s;s)
s
e gna(a)daZ R
s
e gna(a)da
: (52)
1.7 Steady state wage rate and human capital
Assume Y = K (AH)1 , where K = kN; H = hN: Then
y = A1 kh1  =
Y
N
Pre-tax wage per unit of human capital is
w =
@Y
@H
= (1  )A1 KH  = (1  )A1 kh  = (1  ) y
h
:
The steady state after tax wage is calculated according to
w = (1  ) (1  ) y
data
hdata
(53)
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hdata = datah(s;E)

sdata (t)
s
=
: (54)
where data is the experience component as explained in the paper. The relationship of ht (st) and
hss is motivated by the human capital formulation
h (s;E) = (e^=pE) (s)=
when e^ (a) is a constant, e^.
2 Calibration targets
(1) Goods cost of raising a child as a percentage of lifetime income is e rF b1 (F ) =W (s; n).
(2) Return to schooling:
hs (s
;E)
h (s;E)
=


h (s;E) 



de^ (s)
pE

(3) Private expenditures in education as a percentage of GDP, denoted by Epriv/y(US). Ag-
gregate private expenditures in education, denoted by AE, are dened as the following form but
taking into account the demographics in the economy.
Epriv=y(US) =
AE
Yss
=
AE=N
Yss=N
:
We will dene the numerator and the denominator as follows. First the steady state density of
age-a people is
~n(a) =
e gna(a)R1
0 e
 gna(a)da
;
where gn is the steady state population growth satisfying
n (F ) = egnF :
Yss
N
=
w
(1  ) (1  )
Hss
N
It comes from
w = (1  ) (1  ) Yss
Hss
;
where
Hss
N
=
Z R
s
h(a)~n(a)da = h (s;E)
Z R
s
e(a s
) e
 gna(a)R1
0 e
 gna(a)da
da:
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The last equality is because
h (a) = h (s) ev(a s
)
AE
N
=
Z min(s;s)
0
e^(a)
N(a)
N
da+
Z s
sp
e^(a)
N(a)
N
da 
Z min(s;s)
sp
ep
N(a)
N
da
=
Z min(s;s)
0
e^(a)~n(a)da+
Z s
sp
e^(a)~n(a)da 
Z min(s;s)
sp
ep~n(a)da
= be (0)Z min(s;s)
0
q (a)
  1
1  ~n(a)da+ be (0)Z s
sp
q (a)
  1
1  ~n(a)da 
Z min(s;s)
sp
ep~n(a)da:
(4) Assume  = 1; the value of statistical life at age-t is given by
@c (t)
@ (t)
=
@V=@ (t)
@V=@c (t)
=
C  (C   C)  R10 e a  11  @(a)=@(t)(a)  da+ 1 1 (F )  1  @(F )@(t) e F(n)V
C  (C   C)  e tc(t)
=
c(t)et
1  
264
R1
0 e
 a

@(a)=@(t)
(a)

da
+1(F )
 
1  @(F )
@(t)
e F(n)
1 (F )
1 
1  e F(n)

1 + CC C

375
Consider the perpetual youth problem: (a) = (t)e m(a t): In that case, the previous expression
reduces to:
@c (t)
@ (t)
=
c(t)=(t)
1  
1

241 + (F ) 1 1  e (F t)(n)

1  e t + CC C

1   (F ) 1 1  e F(n)
35
At t = F ,
V SL(F ) =
@c (F )
@ (F )
=
c(F )=(F )
1  
1

"
1 + (F )
1 
1  (n)
 
1  e F + C= (C   C)
1   (F ) 1 1  e F(n)
#
(5) Time cost of raising children as a percentage of lifetime income. By (5),
(1  l (n)) R RF e(a s)q(a)daR F
s e
(a s)q(a)da+ l(n)
R R
F e
(a s)q(a)da
(6) Income elasticity of fertility: OLS estimation of  from log(n) =  log (W (s; n;E)) + ".
13
W (s; n) = wh (s;E)
Z F
s
e(a s
)q(a)da+ l(n)
Z R
F
e(a s
)q(a)da

: (55)
3 Solution Algorithm
For each country, we solve the model by rst assuming an initial set of values fs; n; e(0); g
given ep; s; p1; p2; p3 and data obtained from the data, as well as other parameters given. With
these initial values, we can obtain G(n) by (21). The optimal total educational expenditure e^ (s)
evaluated at age s, can be gotten by (25), the private educational expenditure es (a) follows from
(32), and bs is obtained by (29). After bs is solved, sp; h(s;E); hdata; w; E; W (s; n;E); b1;
c (0) ; cS (s) ; cW (s); C; 1; 2 and V can be derived through (30), (34), (54), (53), (33), (5),
(22), (16), (14), (13), (49), (19), (12), and (48) successively. After all these variables are available,
we are able to update s; n; e(0) and  by (40), (46), (27), and (52).
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TABLE 1 
Cross-country descriptive statistics - 2013 
 
 Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
      
GDP per capita (PPP) $17,517 $12,668 $15,135 $63,483 $561 
      
Education      
     School life expectancy (years) 13.86 13.98 3.08 20.43 5.32 
     Compulsory schooling years 10 10 2 15 5 
     Grade repetition rate (primary & secondary) 3.7% 1.2% 5.6% 30.4% 0.0% 
     Public education spending per pupil (PPP) $6,601 $3,952 $7,091 $34,866 $61 
     Relative price government goods 1.17 1.09 0.47 2.93 0.54 
      
Demographics      
     Total fertility rate (number of births) 2.56 2.08 1.33 7.62 1.12 
     Life expectancy at birth (years) 72.17 74.10 8.66 83.83 48.94 
     Survival probability to age 5 0.97 0.98 0.03 1.00 0.85 
     Survival probability to age 65 0.75 0.78 0.13 0.91 0.37 
     Survival probability to age 85 0.29 0.29 0.14 0.55 0.07 
      
 
Notes:  Sample corresponds to 92 countries. GDP per capita (PPP), total fertility rate and life expectancy at birth are from the World 
Development Indicators. School life expectancy, compulsory schooling years, grade repetition rates and public education spending per pupil 
are from UNESCO. Survival probabilities are from the life tables published by the World Population Prospects.  
 
  
TABLE 2 
Exogenous parameters 
 
Parameter Concept Parameter value 
σ Inverse of EIS 1 
r Interest rate 2.5% 
ρ Rate of time preference 2.5% 
α Capital share 0.33 
ν Returns to experience 2% 
F Average childbearing age 28 
R Retirement age 65 
 
Notes:  The values of parameters σ, r, α and ν are standard in the quantitative macro literature. Setting ρ = r implies that the growth rate of consumption 
over the life cycle is determined by the age-dependent mortality rate. Parameter F is consistent with the world average childbearing age from the United 
Nations’ World Fertility Patterns 2015. Parameter R is set to be binding for richer countries.  
TABLE 3 
Calibrated parameters – Benchmark model 
 
Parameter Concept Target Target 
value 
Target in the 
model 
Parameter 
value 
η  Inverse of the elasticity of 
intergenerational substitution  
World mean of schooling 13.86 13.52 0.529 
θ  Mortality risk aversion Value of statistical life at 
childbearing age in the US 
$4 million $4.1 million 0.55 
C Non-market consumption  Income elasticity of fertility  -0.30 -0.32 4500  
γ Returns to scale human capital 
production function 
Average private expenditures in 
education as % of GDP in OECD 
0.9% 0.87% 0.282  
β Degree of substitution education 
spending across ages 
Returns to schooling in the US 8.28% 7.48% 0.164 
ψ Level of altruism Goods cost of raising a child as 
% of lifetime income in US 
16.44% 18.84% 0.54 
χ Degree of child discounting World standard deviation of 
schooling 
3.08 2.52 2.36 
λ Level time cost of raising children World mean of fertility 2.56 2.67 2.9 
κ Shift parameter time cost World minimum fertility 1.12 1.44 1.84 
ξ Elasticity time cost  World maximum schooling 20.43 17.20 0.20 
 
Notes:  Most targets are computed using the sample of countries described in Table 1. The value of statistical life for the US is from Viscusi and Aldi (2003). 
Average OECD private educational expenditures as a % of GDP is from the National Center of Education Statistics.  
TABLE 4 
Model’s performance – Benchmark model 
 
Untargeted moments Data Model 
World quantity-quality trade-off -0.33 -0.40 
World minimum schooling 5.32 7.55 
World maximum fertility 7.62 5.83 
World standard deviation of fertility 1.33 1.04 
Time cost of raising children as % of lifetime income in US 19 to 32% 25.6% 
   
Correlations   
Fertility in model and data = 82.1%   
Schooling in model and data = 78.8%   
 
Notes:  Model is calibrated as in Tables 2 and 3. All data moments are computed using the sample summarized in Table 1. Time cost of raising children 
is computed following Cordoba and Ripoll (2016, 2018) and it corresponds to about 60% of the total cost of raising children ages 0 to 17. 
  
TABLE 5 
Moments in full model 
 
Moments Data Model 
Value of statistical life at childbearing age in the US $4 million $3.99 million 
Income elasticity of fertility  -0.30 -0.30 
Average private expenditures in education as % of GDP in OECD 0.9% 0.99% 
Returns to schooling in the US 8.28% 7.95% 
Goods cost of raising a child as % of lifetime income in US 16.44% 15.05% 
Time cost of raising children as % of lifetime income in US 19 to 32% 31.2% 
 
Notes:  The full model is calibrated as in Tables 2 and 3, but it also includes country-specific β and χ parameters. These country-specific β and χ are 
computed so that the model exactly matches schooling and fertility in each country. 
 
  
TABLE 6 
Counterfactuals (% change) – Full model  
 
 Mean   Standard deviation 
Parameter Schooling Fertility Per capita 
income 
  Schooling Fertility Per capita 
income  
Changes to individual parameters 
TFP 19.9 -36.8 379.2   1.7 -55.7 11.4 
ep 17.7 -11.4 19.9   -4.8 -22.6 -26.6 
?̅? 8.1 -3.5 5.5   -38.9 -11.0 -10.4 
p1 0.7 -1.5 0.3   -2.9 -4.3 -0.4 
p2 6.4 -7.5 5.7   -13.6 -14.6 -7.3 
p3 4.1 -10.0 -7.3   -9.9 -19.7 -0.9 
d 0.2 -0.7 0.7   -0.9 -1.8 -2.0 
pE 3.0 -5.2 13.9   -2.0 -4.2 -3.5 
         
Changes to groups of parameters 
ep, ?̅? 19.7 -17.4 34.7   -11.4 -39.9 -44.0 
p1, p2, p3 11.6 -18.6 -1.9   -25.4 -38.5 -9.2 
 
Notes: Counterfactuals are computed equating each parameter to its value in an artificial country that has the 90th percentile of TFP, survival 
rates and public schooling policies. The full model is calibrated as in Tables 2 and 3, but it also includes country-specific β and χ parameters. 
These country-specific β and χ are computed so that the model exactly matches schooling and fertility in each country. The standard deviation 
of per capita income is computed over the log (10 base) of income. 
  
TABLE 7 
Counterfactuals (% change) – Benchmark model  
 
 Mean   Standard deviation 
Parameter Schooling Fertility Per capita 
income 
  Schooling Fertility Per capita 
income  
Changes to individual parameters 
TFP 12.7 -25.8 67.8   -43.6 -62.1 -73.2 
ep 22.6 -11.4 22.3   -0.8 -23.2 -28.9 
?̅? 8.5 -3.2 5.9   -53.6 -10.7 -11.6 
p1 0.8 -1.3 0.3   -4.0 -4.2 -0.3 
p2 6.2 -7.0 5.8   -22.1 -15.9 -7.3 
p3 3.9 -9.6 -4.1   -12.9 -19.9 -4.8 
d 0.2 -0.6 0.8   -1.1 -1.9 -2.0 
pE 3.0 -5.3 15.7   -2.0 -4.0 -2.7 
         
Changes to groups of parameters 
ep, ?̅? 24.1 -16.9 38.0   0.5 -39.6 -47.1 
p1, p2, p3 11.3 -17.5 1.4   -40.3 -39.6 -13.7 
 
Notes: Counterfactuals are computed equating each parameter to its value in an artificial country that has the 90th percentile of TFP, survival 
rates and public schooling policies. The benchmark model is calibrated as in Tables 2 and 3. In the benchmark model β and χ are the same 
across countries. The standard deviation of per capita income is computed over the log (10 base) of income. 
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FIGURE 1 
International quantity-quality trade-off in the data- 2013
Notes: Fertility is from the World Development indicators and it corresponds to the total fertility rate, or the number of children that would be born to 
a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with age-specific fertility rates. School life 
expectancy is from UNESCO and it corresponds to total number of years of schooling a child expects to receive assuming that the probability of 
being enrolled in school equals the current enrollment ratio for each age. 
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FIGURE 2 
Survival probabilities by age in selected countries
Notes: Age-specific survival rates are calibrated for each country by assuming a survival probability process with distinct constant hazard rates before age 5, 
between ages 5 and 65, and after age 65. Hazard rates are calibrated to the survival probabilities at ages 5, 65 and 85 from the World Population Prospects 
data. 
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FIGURE 3 
Average duration of public education subsidy and school life expectancy- 2013
Notes: Average duration of the public education subsidy captures the number of years the representative child in each country receives public 
education subsidies. It is constructed using public enrollment ratios and duration of schooling in primary, secondary and terciary from UNESCO.
School life expectancy is from UNESCO as in Figure 1.
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FIGURE 4 
Public education subsidy per pupil and GDP per capita- 2013
Notes: Public education subsidies per pupil are constructed by dividing total government educational expenditures (PPP adjusted) by the total
number of students enrolled in public institutions from UNESCO. GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) is from the World Development Indicators.
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FIGURE 5 
Fertility and schooling - Benchmark model versus data
Notes: Fertilty in the data corresponds to total fertility rate as in Figure 1. Schooling in the data corresponds to school life expectancy as in Figure 1. The benchmark 
model is calibrated as in Tables 1 and 2, with countries having the same β and χ parameters.
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FIGURE 6 
Returns to schooling and school life expectancy- Full model
Notes: The full model exactly matches the data by introducing two additional country-specific parameters. Altruisitc parameter χ is calibrated to 
each country so that fertility in the model is the same as in the data. Human capital production function parameter β is calibrated to each country 
so that schooling in the model is the same as in the data.
ALB
ARM
AUS
BDI
BEL
BEN
BGD
BGR
BLZ
BOL
BRA
BWA
CAF
CHE
CHL
CMR
COL
CRI
CYP
DNK
DOM
ECU
EGY
ESPEST
FIN
FRA
GBR
GHA
GTM
HKG
HND
HRV
HUN
IDN
IND
IRL
IRN
ISL
ITA
JAM
JPN
KAZ
KENKGZ
KHM
KOR
LAO
LKA
LSO
LTU
LVA
MAR
MDA
MEX
MLI
MLT
MNG
MOZ
MUS
MWI MYS
NAM
NER
NLD
NOR
NPL
NZL
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
PRY
ROM
SEN
SRB
SVN
SWE
SWZ
TGO
THATJK
TUR
UGA
UKR
URY
USA
VEN
YEM
ZAF
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8
f
u
l
l
 
m
o
d
e
l
benchmark model
FIGURE 7
Human capital in benchmark and full models - Log10 scale
Notes: Full model is computed as in Figure 6. Human capital is measured at the completion of schooling, so it excludes the experience 
component. 
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FIGURE 8
TFP in benchmark and full models - Log10 scale
Notes: Same as in Figure 7. TFP is computed as a residual of each the benchmark and the full models.
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FIGURE 9
Equating TFP to the 90th percentile value - Fertility and schooling under the counterfactual
Notes: Fertilty and schooling in the data are from Figure 1. Counterfactual fertility and schooling are computed using the full model with country-specific  β and χ
parameters.
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FIGURE 10
Fertility and schooling as a function of TFP - United States 
Notes: Fertility and schooling are shown as functions of hypothetical values of TFP. The figure uses the calibrated parameters for the full model in Tables 2 and 3, as 
well as the country-specific parameters for the United States, including the US-specific β and χ.
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FIGURE 11
Equating all parameters except for TFP - Fertility and schooling under the counterfactual
Notes: All parameters are equated across countries except for TFP. Schooling provision is equated to the 90th percentile and mortality rates to the 10th percentile. β
and χ in all countries are equal to their calibrated values in Table 3.
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FIGURE 12 
Equating amount of public education subsidy per pupil to the 90th percentile value - Fertility and schooling under the counterfactual
Notes: Same as in Figure 9.
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FIGURE 13 
Equating duration of public education subsidy to the 90th percentile value - Fertility and schooling under the counterfactual
Notes: Same as in Figure 9.
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FIGURE 14
Equating all mortality rates to the 10th percentile value - Fertility and schooling under the counterfactual
Notes: Same as in Figure 9.
